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NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY
The following is a note on orthography, written by Kabir Tambar in his book, The
Reckoning of Pluralism: Political Belonging and The Demands of History in Turkey.
“Modern Turkish is written with the Latin alphabet. Most letters loosely correspond to
characters found in English, but there are a few differences. The Turkish c is pronounced like
the English j as in jam. J is pronounced like the final “ge” of the French rouge. C is pronounced
“ch” as in child. Ş is “sh” as in show. İ and ı (i.e., with and without a dot) are comparable to
“ee” and “uh” respectively. Ğ lengthens the vowel preceding it but is not pronounced
separately. Umlauts (as in ö and ü) are akin to those in German.”1
In this thesis, I use modern standard Turkish orthography in several contexts: when referencing
Turkish institutions (i.e., Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı); when referencing Turkish individuals (i.e.,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan); when referencing Ottomanized and Turkified versions of Islamic
terminology which originate in Arabic (i.e., devşirme); and, when referencing certain Turkish
words which are central to my thesis (i.e., eşhās-ı mütegayyibe).

Kabir Tambar, The Reckoning of Pluralism: Political Belonging and the Demands of History in
Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), ix.
1
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) handed down a landmark decision which
ruled that the destruction of cultural heritage is a violation of human rights. The ICC case dealt
with the destruction of religious and historical statues in Mali by Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, a
member of the Tuareg Islamist separatist group Ansar Dine. After his 2012 destruction of nine
mausoleums and the secret gate of the Sidi Yahia Mosque, which is part of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site of Timbuktu
in Mali, Al Mahdi was convicted of a war crime by a unanimous ICC Chamber decision.2 Issues
of shared memory and collective consciousness were central to the case, and Al Mahdi’s actions
came to be understood not only as an attack on physical sites, but as an attack on identity and
culture. This ICC decision reframed within the context of international human rights law the
importance of the protection, preservation, and restoration of cultural heritage as a means of
safeguarding and sustaining vulnerable identity communities around the world. Despite this
paradigm shift in international law, the endangerment of cultural heritage is a worldwide
phenomenon.
As recently as January 2020, former U.S. President Donald Trump, in the midst of
escalating diplomatic tensions and military provocations between the United States and Iran,
suggested in a press briefing that Iran’s cultural sites were legitimate military targets. Trump’s
statements provoked sharp criticism by the international human rights experts, historians, and
diplomats. Consequently, Trump retreated from his original statements, but his comments
generated an international discussion about the delicate space that culture, memory, and place
hold in armed and non-violent conflicts. Most specifically, the outcry over Trump’s comments
2

Sebastian Green Martinez, “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali: A Crime
Against Humanity?,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 13, no. 5 (2010): 1073.
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underscored the need for greater respect for and compliance with international legal frameworks,
as well as the need to develop robust commitments to cultural heritage as a universal human
rights issue of existential significance for vulnerable identity communities around the world.
This thesis will explore the linkages between nationalism and cultural heritage, analyzing
the use of cultural heritage as a potent tool for building exclusivist nationalism. I will employ a
case study focusing on state ideologies and policies toward ethnic and religious minority
communities in Turkey, examining the long-term effect of these policies on vulnerable identity
communities. In this thesis I will refer to ethnic and religious minority communities as ethnoreligious minority communities. The ethno-religious minority community that is the subject of
my thesis is the Greek Orthodox Christian community in Turkey. One can begin to map the
effects of exclusivist state policies pertaining to cultural heritage on the survival of minority
communities—in the Turkish case, policies of cleansing, homogenization, and discrimination
have been the modus operandi, while the international human rights framework puts forth
policies of democratization, pluralism, and equality. An examination of the Turkish state’s
appropriation and destruction of the cultural heritage sites of ethno-religious minorities is but one
aspect of its violation of the human rights of these minorities.
My case study will be an investigation into state policies that are designed to eradicate
and/or appropriate cultural heritage, and how these policies are not only operationalized
manifestations of exclusivist nationalism, but also reinforcing tools in building exclusivist forms
of nationalism. I will explore how, where minorities are concerned, the aforementioned state
policies have as their singular goal the eradication of the past, suppression of the present, and
circumscription of the future of these minority communities. I will also investigate Turkish
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nationalist ideology and map the continuity of exclusivist Turkish nationalism throughout the
longue durée of the history of the Turkish Republic.
I have selected Turkey as my case study for several reasons. First, there is a sizeable
literature and an abundance of data on the subjects of nationalism and cultural heritage in
Turkey. Yet, there has been a remarkable dearth of research on the linkages between the Turkish
state’s project of nation-building and the cultural heritage of Turkey’s ethno-religious minorities.
Therefore, my thesis will address a gap in the respective literatures on nationalism and cultural
heritage in Turkey, thereby revealing the historical continuities in the Turkish statemakers’
approach to the cultural heritage of the Greek Orthodox community for purposes of constructing
an exclusivist form of nationalism rooted in evolving configurations of Turkish ethnicity and
Sunni Islamic religion. My thesis aims to draw generalizable conclusions from the case study of
Turkey, regarding the significance of cultural heritage as a tool for national identity construction
and, likewise, regarding the critical importance of protecting cultural heritage of vulnerable
ethno-religious communities whose sustainability and memory are endangered by state projects
of homogenizing, exclusivist nationalism.
I will address the following research question in my thesis. How and why do states
utilize cultural heritage policy to build exclusivist forms of nationalism or, more specifically,
models of nationalism that exclude ethno-religious minorities? In answering this question, I will
also address several sub-questions. First, what is cultural heritage? Second, how do states utilize
policy dealing with the two types of cultural heritage (tangible and intangible) to exclude certain
populations? In my case study of Turkey and its treatment of the Greek Orthodox minority
population, I will examine two specific periods in Turkish history: the Atatürk period (1920 to
1938) and the Erdoğan period (2001 to present). Therefore, my case-specific question will be as
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follows: How and why has the Turkish state utilized policy dealing with tangible and intangible
forms of cultural heritage to realize a nationalist ideology that excludes the Greek Orthodox
Christian minority of Turkey?

Literature Review
In order to address the aforementioned questions, I will first survey the relevant scholarly
literature to provide the foundational and theoretical knowledge for my topic. In this section I
present the literature through the exploration of three primary questions, examining the
theoretical bases of cultural heritage. First, what is cultural heritage? Second, what are the types
of cultural heritage? Third, why is cultural heritage a useful tool for states in building
nationalism?
Before exploring these questions, I will first explain the choices which I have made
regarding the methodology. Three primary and intersecting literatures are relevant to my topic:
cultural heritage, nationalism, and cultural heritage as it intersects with nationalism. I have made
a methodological choice to focus on the following two categories of the literature: one, cultural
heritage by itself, and, two, cultural heritage in connection to nationalism. I am not going to
devote inordinate space in this thesis to the vast general literature on nationalism. Rather, my
primary focus is on how the definition of cultural heritage becomes useful to how and why states
view heritage as significant, or, determinant, in nationalist political projects. I am making this
methodological choice to focus primarily on those two categories because this is not a thesis
solely on nationalism or solely on cultural heritage, but rather one on the linkages between
nationalism and cultural heritage. And, in particular, it is a thesis that investigates how and why
states use cultural heritage as a tool to build a national community that can be inclusivist or

5
exclusivist, and how states see cultural heritage as particularly useful in building exclusivist
forms of nationalism.
I dedicate space to the literature on cultural heritage, specifically, because it is less
widely-known and more recently developed than the long-standing literature on nationalism.
The intersection of cultural heritage and nationalism, specifically, is one where the literature is
relatively sparse and underdeveloped, having only recently expanded. For the most part,
scholars have tended to focus either on nationalism or on cultural heritage, but less closely on the
intrinsic connections between the two. Consequently, I will be doing largely original work, and
my literature review is interdisciplinary.
Having explained my methodological choices and motivations, I will now turn to the
questions posed above and address them through a survey of the relevant literature on cultural
heritage, and on cultural heritage as it intersects with nationalism.

Defining Cultural Heritage
What is cultural heritage and what are its two types? In this section I answer these
primary questions through an exploration of the scholarly literature, looking specifically at
international legal definitions of cultural heritage.
I will begin by addressing the first question, and examine how cultural heritage is
typically defined. The definition put forth by Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan in The New
Oxford Companion to Law in 20083 is especially helpful, as it identifies what is at the crux of the
idea of cultural heritage. According to Cane and Conaghan, “here is growing interest at national
and international levels in developing legal means to afford protection to evidence of the human

3

Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan, “Cultural heritage,” in The New Oxford Companion to Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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past which is regarded as worthy of preservation. The term ‘cultural heritage’ is generally used
to denote such evidence.”4 Cane and Conaghan also suggest that cultural heritage can be broken
down into two essential definitional parts that must be understood both in their individuality and
in their symbiotic capacity. The authors state: “The word ‘heritage’ is suggestive of an
inheritance: we have inherited something of value that we should preserve and pass on to future
generations. The word ‘cultural’ indicates that this heritage pertains to humankind and provides
evidence of human intellectual development.”5
Inherent to the definition of cultural heritage is the idea that the past, the present, and the
future are all inextricably interwoven and, equally important, the idea that the past and “things”
of the past should not be dismissed as inconsequential or irrelevant. In a Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy article entitled “The Ethics of Cultural Heritage,”6 Erich Hatala Matthes expounds
upon the significance of cultural heritage for historiography, memory, and chronicity. Matthes
writes, “On the one hand, cultural heritage is about the past, as suggested by the ubiquitous
framing of heritage ethics topics in terms of the question ‘Who owns the past?’ But, on the other
hand, cultural heritage is just as much about the present and the future: about how culture is
embroiled in contemporary moral controversies, and about what our cultural legacy will be.”7
Similarly, political scientist Elizabeth Prodromou highlights the organic connections
between cultural heritage, time, and history, in her analysis of the Turkish state’s cultural

4

Cane and Conaghan, “Cultural heritage.”
Ibid.
6
Erich Hatala Matthes, “The Ethics of Cultural Heritage,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/ethics-culturalheritage/.
7
Ibid.
5
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heritage policy.8 In her essay for the Religious Freedom Institute, Prodromou argues that
international principles, norms, and mechanisms capture “the crucial significance of memory as a
mechanism of the synchronic and diachronic sustainability of religious communities, whether in
robust, living communities or in at-risk communities.”9 Indeed, Prodromou specifically invokes
religious communities in the context of cultural heritage policies, but the undeniable importance
of cultural heritage and its bilateral policies have the potential to affect and be applied to any
identity group, whether it be religious, ethnic, national, racial, or otherwise.
Here we address our second question and identify the two types of cultural
heritage. Looking again to Cane and Conaghan: “Cultural heritage is commonly divided into
two categories: tangible and intangible. Tangible cultural heritage comprises remains of human
existence that are material, in the sense that we can touch them. Tangible remains can be subdivided into movable objects, such as paintings and antiquities, and immovable buildings,
monuments, and sites. Intangible cultural heritage, sometimes referred to as ‘living heritage,’
cannot be touched, but might be seen (a dance, a performance of a play or ritual) or heard
(music, or a spoken language).”10 A brief review of the history of the codification of cultural
heritage in international legal settings helps to elucidate the distinctiveness and importance of
tangible and intangible types of cultural heritage.
Cultural heritage has been codified in a variety of international laws and treaties, and it
has been developing as an idea on a broad normative level for over a century. Manlio Frigo,
Professor of International and European Law at the University of Milan, notes that the
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Elizabeth H. Prodromou, “Turkey’s Cultural Heritage Cudgel,” Religious Freedom Institute, 12
June 2020, https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/cornerstone/turkeys-cultural-heritagecudgel.
9
Ibid.
10
Cane and Conaghan, “Cultural heritage.”
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international codification of cultural heritage laws began in 1899 at the First Hague
Convention.11 The first two Hague Conventions, negotiated in 1899 and 1907, were multilateral
treaties which adopted norms outlined in the 1863 Lieber Code, an American Civil War
document which became codified law in the United States. Because the Lieber Code dealt
specifically with military conduct in periods of war, early understandings of what would
eventually come to be known as cultural heritage were largely limited to the context of armed
conflict.
Frigo writes, “According to an established rule of customary international law, the
destruction, pillage, looting or confiscation of works of art and other items of public or private
cultural property in the course of armed conflicts must be considered unlawful.”12 This
customary rule refers only to tangible cultural heritage, and specifically, to the protection of
tangible cultural heritage in times of armed conflict. Over the course of the 20th century,
however, international understandings of cultural heritage expanded to include intangible forms
of cultural heritage and to identify the importance of protecting cultural heritage not only in
times of armed conflict, but in peacetime, as well.
The 1954 Hague Convention updated cultural heritage laws in the wake of World War II,
and the 1970 Convention articulated laws for the regulation of illicit trade and ownership of
cultural heritage. The UNESCO World Heritage Convention of 1972 called for the defense of
cultural heritage as an “outstanding universal value”13 and enacted specific protections for
cultural heritage designated as world heritage of universal value. The 2003 UNESCO

Manlio Frigo, “Cultural property v. cultural heritage: A ‘battle of concepts’ in international
law?,” Cambridge University Press International Review of the Red Cross 86, no. 854 (27 April
2010).
12
Ibid.
13
Cane and Conaghan, “Cultural heritage.”
11
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Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage14 was a major step in
formalizing a comprehensive protection regime for cultural heritage. Most specifically, the
Convention defined intangible cultural heritage and provided for international mechanisms of
cooperation and assistance to protect intangible cultural heritage. It bears mention that elements
of chronicity, memory, and sustainability were explicitly recognized in the international cultural
heritage protection regimes—emblematic, in this regard, is the 2003 Convention’s specification
that “…intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly
recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with
nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity…”15 In sum,
within the period from the late 19th century to the early 21st century, the international community
came to recognize the value of cultural heritage for local, national, and global communities, and
articulated an interlocking protection regime for both tangible and intangible forms of cultural
heritage.
Having answered my first two questions through a review of the literature, it is important
to highlight a conceptual weakness running through research on cultural heritage, stemming from
the fact that “the term ‘cultural property’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘cultural
heritage.’”16 While it is noted in the literature that the division of cultural heritage into the
tangible and the intangible is one which derives from property law, the synonymizing of cultural
property with cultural heritage creates a false and problematic equivalence, and therefore must be
rejected.

14

“Text of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,” United
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
https://ich.unesco.org/en/convention.
15
Ibid
16
Cane and Conaghan, “Cultural heritage.”
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Cultural heritage is an idea whose two parts of “heritage” and “cultural” must be
recognized as two individual entities. This recognition is crucial to a proper understanding of the
whole term. To equate cultural heritage with cultural property privileges property over heritage,
a non-comprehensive and outdated notion which excludes the vital importance of intangible
forms of cultural heritage. Indeed, the word “property” has come to be attached to both material
and non-material entities but, within the context of such a nuanced and continuously-evolving
term, it unnecessarily muddies the definitional waters. As mentioned above, the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions exclusively used the term “cultural property” in legal documents. Cultural
property, however, was used in that context only to describe tangible cultural heritage, and
broader ideas of cultural heritage which encompass both the tangible and the intangible had not
yet been developed in international law.
One might look to the 1970 UNESCO Convention regarding the illicit trade and transfer
of cultural heritage to more clearly understand the problems with using “heritage” and
“property” synonymously. Article 1 of the Convention invokes the term “cultural property” in
reference to categories of physical goods (tangible cultural heritage), defined as “property which,
on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance
for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science.”17 Article 2 of the Convention
states that “the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property is one of the
main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such

17

“Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris, 14 November 1970,” UNESCO,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
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property.”18 These articles render clear both the distinctions and relationships between cultural
heritage and cultural property. Cultural property is simply one component of cultural heritage.
Therefore, aiming for definitional clarity, I will refrain from using the terms “cultural
heritage” and “cultural property” synonymously in this thesis. I will use the term “cultural
property” only as it pertains to tangible cultural heritage.

Role of Cultural Heritage in Building Nationalism
Why is cultural heritage a useful tool for states in building nationalism? In this section, I
will answer this third question that is central to my thesis by exploring the relevant scholarly
literatures dealing with the constitutive features of nationalism.
In his article, “The Ethical Significance of Nationality,” David Miller defines
nationality. While Miller does not employ the term nationalism, his focus on nationality helps to
understand the legal and identity dimensions of the ideology of nationalism. According to
Miller:
…nationality is essentially a subjective phenomenon, constituted by the shared beliefs of
a set of people: a belief that each belongs together with the rest; that this association is
neither transitory nor merely instrumental but stems from a long history of living together
which (it is hoped and expected) will continue into the future; that the community is
marked off from other communities by its members’ distinctive characteristics; and each
member recognizes a loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice
personal gain to advance its interests.19

Accordingly, Miller identifies three major facets of nationality: shared beliefs, community, and
historicity. One might recall that all of these three factors are central to understanding cultural
18

“Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing,” UNESCO.
David Miller, “The Ethical Significance of Nationality,” The University of Chicago Press,
Vol. 98, No. 4 (July 1988), 648.
19
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heritage. Cultural heritage is the reflection of shared beliefs, serves as a tool for building and
maintaining community, and expresses historicity by connecting the past, present, and future.
Thus, cultural heritage might be used as an excellent strategic tool in building
nationalism, both inclusivist and exclusivist. In this context, cultural heritage has both practical
and emotional value, acting as an excellent tool to shape societies.

Research Design
My thesis deploys a single case study model, using Turkey as my case study. I use a
combination of quantitative and qualitative data to illustrate and support my claims, as specified
in the following section.
This thesis has two intersectional components. The theoretical component analyzes the
relationship between nationalism and cultural heritage. The empirical component explores the
project of Turkish nation-building in two historical periods and the centrality of cultural heritage
to iterations of Turkish nationalism. The conceptual and empirical components of my thesis
enable me to elucidate patterns of historical continuity. The demonstration of a historically
continuous pattern is, in and of itself, valuable on an analytical level, but it also helps to support
another claim which I am making in my thesis. That is, while Kemalism and Erdoğanism are
conventionally understood as two oppositional phenomena and philosophies, they are not, in
fact, oppositional. On the contrary, the philosophies mirror one another and possess the same
ultimate goal: to create an exclusivist, ethnically Turkish, Sunni Muslim society that is governed
by ethnically Turkish, Sunni Muslims. The critical difference between the Kemalist and
Erdoğanist versions of nationalism lies not in doctrine, but in presented nation-building
objectives.
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Kemalists cite the need to create a “secular” state (which, according to Kemalism, is the
strongest type of state) as justification for the development of cultural heritage policies which, in
reality, only require minority groups to practice secularity. Erdoğanists cite the need to create a
“conservative democratic”20 state informed by neo-Ottomanism as justification for the
development of comparable cultural heritage policies. This speaks to the importance of
perception and the power of cultural heritage policies in shaping perceptions of different
nationalisms.

Chapter Outline
In Chapter Two, I address the first part of my case study: the Mustafa Kemal “Atatürk”
period in the early, foundational years of the modern21 Republic of Turkey (1923 to 1938). This
chapter examines the Ottoman roots of exclusivism and provides a synoptic account of
exclusivist proto-nationalism and proto-cultural heritage policies in the Ottoman
Empire. Furthermore, the chapter addresses what constitutes Turkish identity in the Kemalist
ideological tradition.
I will examine the “secularization” and “Westernization” projects of Atatürk, drawing on
Turkish anthropological publications to investigate how ethno-religious minorities were
portrayed by Turkish state institutions during the Kemalist period. I will also closely examine
20

Emad Y. Kaddorah, “Conservative Democracy and the Future of Turkish Secularism,” Arab
Center for Research and Policy Studies (May 2015),
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPSPDFDocumentLibrary/Conservative_Democracy_and_Turkey_Research_Paper.pdf.
21
It is important to clarify my use of the word “modern” when written in conjunction with
“state”; i.e. “modern state” or “modern Republic of Turkey.” My use of “modern” in this
context denotes the presence of the Westphalian model of the nation state and sovereignty. The
Republic of Turkey is the “modern state” which grew out of the Ottoman Empire. In this
context, I am not using the word “modern” to communicate that something is contemporary,
current, or up-to-date.
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the constitutional policies established in the early years of the Turkish Republic; specifically,
those pertaining to cultural heritage and including cultural property, education, and language.
In Chapter Three, I will present the second part of my case: the Erdoğan period (2001 to
the present). Here I will offer background on the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and
President Erdoğan and examine the de facto Islamic theocracy which is presently in place in
Turkey. I will present statistics and examples of cultural heritage erasure (for example, the
conversion of churches into mosques and Islamic cultural centers). I will incorporate data from
my own interviews with members of the Greek Orthodox community of Turkey to demonstrate
the quotidian impact of Turkey’s exclusivist nationalism and cultural heritage policies on the
lived experience of ethno-religious minorities.
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CHAPTER TWO: FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

In 1894, Christians accounted for 20 percent of the population of the Ottoman
Empire.22 Approximately half of these Christians were Greek Orthodox.23 By 1924, Christians
only accounted for two percent of the population of the Republic of Turkey.24 Today, Turkey is
the 17th most populous country in the world, with a population of 85 million people. Of these 85
million, only 89,000 are non-Muslims.25 Of these 89,000,26 it is estimated that there are only
1,700 to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians, making up 0.002% of the overall population of
Turkey.27
In pondering this significant change in demographics, a student of Political Science might
consider ethnic cleansing, population exchange, or emigration (out-migration) as potential
factors. This student would not be incorrect in their postulations. Between 1914 and 1924,
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Stanford Shaw, “The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1814,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 3 (October 1978): 325-338.
23
Ibid.
24
The Ottoman Empire conducted frequent censuses following the establishment of the Ceride-i
Nufus Nezareti (Ottoman Census Department) by Sultan Mahmud II in 1831, in the years leading
up to the Tanzimat Reforms. According to the Ottoman census of 1906, there were
approximately 15.5 million Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire, and there were
approximately 5.4 million non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, the Ottoman
Census Department reported 15 million Muslims in the Empire, while the non-Muslim
population had dipped to 3.5 million. 1.7 of these 3.5 million non-Muslims were Greek
Orthodox Christians.
25
Benny Morris and Dror Ze’evi, The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its
Christian Minorities, 1894-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 42.
26
For purposes of viewing a fuller picture of Turkish society, is important to note the situation of
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400,000 to 500,000 Greek Orthodox Christians in Anatolia were killed by Ottoman and Turkish
authorities.28 During the same period, 1.5 million Greek Orthodox Christians in Anatolia were
forcibly resettled in Greece—approximately 1.2 million were displaced during the 1923
population exchange between Greece and Turkey.29
Despite this trendline, there remained a measurable community of 350,000 Greek
Orthodox Christians in Turkey in 1924.30 Today’s 1,700 to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians are
the remnant of this historic community. What, then, accounts for this precipitous and continuous
decline in the last century, when the two aforementioned factors of genocide and population
exchange were absent? The development of cultural heritage policies by the Turkish state to
build exclusivist nationalism provides an explanation of these numbers.
The broad focus of this chapter is the examination of the cultural heritage policies of the
long Atatürk period, from 1923 to 1938, and the effect of these policies on building exclusivist
nationalism in Turkey. In addressing this first part of my case study, I identify the Ottoman roots
of exclusivist Turkish nationalism, provide an identification and explanation of Kemalist
thought, and identify Atatürk’s cultural heritage policies. In order to most effectively illustrate
these intersecting issues, I have divided this chapter into three parts.
In Part I, we begin with an examination of the Ottoman foundations of the Turkish state
and of Ottomanization as a proto-nationalistic philosophy and set of policy directives. In order
to most effectively understand the identity-driven dynamics of Turkish society, we must
recognize the legacy of Ottomanism and situate the case of Turkish state and society within a
logical historical context. I provide a concise survey of the unequal structure of Ottoman
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society, and of Ottoman policies regarding ethno-religious minorities such as Greek Orthodox
Christians.
Parts II and III of this chapter are complementary, in that Part II establishes the
theoretical while Part III establishes the operational aspects of the Turkish nationalism of the
early Turkish Republic. Specifically, in Part II, I explore Kemalism, the founding nationalist
ideology of the Turkish Republic and the ideological foundation for Atatürk’s cultural heritage
policies. In this part we see the explicit codification of exclusivist nationalist ideology into stateproduced anthropological writings and examine how Kemalism defined what it means to be
“Turkish” and what constitutes “Turkishness.”
In Part III, I identify Atatürk’s cultural heritage policies and how they worked to
strengthen exclusivist Turkish nationalism and effectively exclude and drive out Greek Orthodox
Christians from Turkey and Turkish society. Furthermore, an overarching objective of Parts II
and III of this chapter is to explain what Kemalist “secularism” actually meant and how it was
applied on a policy level.

Part I: Separate and Unequal: Ottoman Roots of Exclusion
An investigation into Turkish nationalism necessarily begins with a brief survey of
Turkish history, and, specifically, a historical survey of the Ottoman Empire, which gave birth to
the modern Republic of Turkey and the laid the foundation for the major tenets of Turkish
nationalism. It is useful to recall David Miller’s identification of historicity as one of the three
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major facets of nationality,31 as well as the international human rights community’s identification
of shared history as a central characteristic of cultural heritage.
The Ottoman Empire is often described by historians, political scientists, and
anthropologists as a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multicultural empire. Indeed, Christians, Jews,
Muslims, and other religious communities lived in the Ottoman Empire. The empire was
comparably diverse in its vast array of resident ethnic groups, with Greeks, Armenians,
Assyrians, Kurds, Arabs, and Turks creating a mosaic of various identity groups.
Until recently, the dominant historiographical treatment of the Ottoman Empire equated
ethno-religious diversity with equality before the law and in practice. Moreover, the elision of
multi-group equality facilely assumed that all individuals in the empire enjoyed equal legal
status. Taken as a whole, this long-standing historiographical perspective embedded in the
phrase “multicultural” was one with a positive connotation.
This is a dangerous distortion of the historical record which omits the Ottoman state’s
policies of cleansing, homogenization, and discrimination against ethno-religious minorities and
reframes the Ottoman foundations of Turkish nationalism through a significantly flawed
lens. Furthermore, this conflation of diversity with equality in the Ottoman case aids in the
promulgation of the dominant hegemonic narrative that the Turkish state implements today in
their politics of exclusion and erasure.
This dominant hegemonic narrative was defined by a revision and concealment of the
empirical historical record. This phenomenon of concealment has been complemented by an
equally problematic conceptual disconnect between the Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish
Republic by many scholars. In Zeyno Baran’s 2010 book, Torn Country: Turkey between
Miller identifies shared beliefs, community, and historicity as the three major facts of
nationality.
31
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Secularism and Islam, she writes: “The Ottoman sultans developed a concept of Ottoman
nationality to bind their ethnically and religiously diverse subjects together. Not until the mideighteen hundreds, as nationalist doctrines gained momentum across Europe, did the concept of a
Turkish identity began [sic.] to take shape.”32
This statement communicates a certain distance and disconnect between Ottoman
nationality/identity and Turkish nationality/identity, and fails to acknowledge the fact that
Turkish identity grew directly out of Ottoman identity.
Within the last quarter century, however, a critical historiographical school has emerged
regarding nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the roots of Turkish nationalism in
Ottomanism. Scholars such as Taha Parla and Fatma Göçek are critiquing this state-centered,
official historiography that was—not incidentally—exported and globalized into transatlantic
academic and policy spaces within the broader context of Orientalism.33
The Ottoman Empire was, in reality, a deeply unequal empire, based on a system of
division that included and protected ethnically Turkish, Sunni Muslim subjects, and excluded
and abused non-Turkish, non-Sunni Muslim subjects. The language of nationalism which is
associated with modern states was already present in Ottoman state structures and practices. As
an empire governed on a broad level by Islamic jurisprudence,34 Ottoman law had very different
implications for different religious groups.
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Ottoman society was divided along millets, which were administrative groupings of
separate religious populations. The Orthodox Christian millet was called the Rum millet,
meaning “nation of the Romans.”35 Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire were known as
dhimmi,36 and were subject to certain laws that did not apply to Muslims. Dhimmi were required
to pay the jizya—a tax imposed on non-Muslims—to their respective millets.37 Many scholars
argue that Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire actually enjoyed a protected status, given
that the Quran refers to dhimmi as “protected people.”38 This so-called “protected status” did not
actually protect dhimmi, but rather gave them an ultimatum: taxation, exile, or death.39 Dhimmi
could also renounce their faith and convert to Islam to avoid paying the jizya, and, in doing so,
become part of the privileged Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire. Dhimmi were also
forbidden from riding horses or camels, forbidden from owning weapons, and forbidden from
holding public office.40 Dhimmi were also required to “yield the center of the road” to Muslims,
and were prohibited from giving evidence in Ottoman courts against Muslims.41 Therefore, it is
more helpful, in our critical examination of Ottoman history, to conceptualize dhimmi status as
second-class or minority status, rather than privileged status.42
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Dhimmi status and the jizya tax may ring familiar for contemporary scholars of the
Middle East. Today, the Islamic State has imposed the jizya tax on Christians, Jews, and Yazidis
in territories which it has captured in the Middle East.43 The title of a 2014 Forbes article
illustrated this phenomenon with a straight-forward title: “Islamic State Warns Christians:
Convert, Pay Tax, Leave, or Die.”44 One might look to the case of mafia-controlled areas in
Italy to further understand this notion of “protection” in another context, in which citizens are
required to pay taxes to local mafia groups as “protection.”45 If citizens do not pay taxes to the
local mafia branch, they are either killed, or flee to escape being murdered.46
We return to Zeyno Baran’s Torn Country to discuss another Ottoman practice pertaining
to non-Muslims. In discussing the various factors which accounted for the Ottoman Empire’s
nearly 500 year rule, Baran identifies the impact of Ottoman conquests and accumulation of
slaves from conquered lands. She writes: “The Ottoman sultans brought European slaves to
work in the Topkapi Palace as counselors and new troops (or janissaries) who served as the
sultans’ personal security force.”47 In her chapter-long discussion of the structure and practices
of the Ottoman Empire and in the aforementioned passage about “European” slaves, Baran fails
so, in this regard, “minority” really means “other.” The majority-minority relationship applies to
law and practice, where political control and religious identity were one and the same. It is also
worth mentioning that, on a numerical level, non-Muslims actually constituted a numerical
majority for a certain duration in the Ottoman Empire. At the time of the Ottoman conquest of
Constantinople, the Byzantine Empire was primarily comprised of non-Muslims.
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to acknowledge the largest pool of slave labor used by the Ottoman Empire—that of Christian
Ottoman subjects in the devşirme system.
First mentioned in written records in 1438,48 the devşirme system involved the abduction
of Christian boys (who were most often between the ages of eight and 20) from their families.49
These boys were forcibly converted to Islam and made to be soldiers or sex slaves for the Sultan
in Constantinople.50 The devşirme system was, quite simply, institutionalized abduction,
conversion, and, ultimately, forced labor or sex slavery of countless individuals based on their
religious background.
Ultimately, Ottoman society was deeply divided along religious lines, with non-Muslims
as second-class citizens. While, on a surface level, the Ottoman Empire gave all religious groups
“autonomy” in the form of their own pseudo-administrative spaces of the millets, the actual
foundational structure of the Ottoman state and law created, as Enver Ziya Karal writes, “two
societies, side by side, with unequal rights.”51 This inequality extended beyond dhimmi status,
the jizya, and the devşirme system, and also manifested itself in policies which, when applied to
the modern state system, can be characterized as cultural heritage policies and practices. More
specifically, these were policies created with the intention of destroying the tangible and
intangible cultural heritage of Greek Orthodox Christians.
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The Ottoman state routinely demolished Greek Orthodox churches and houses owned by
Greek Orthodox people, and, while it was technically legal for the Rum millet to build churches,
hyper-specific prohibitions about the locations and building specifications of churches largely
prevented their construction.
The work of French Byzantinist Vitalien Laurent is particularly revealing on these
issues. Laurent was the long-time editor of the Revue des études byzantines (Review of
Byzantine Studies), which was established in 1897 as Échos d'Orient (Echoes of East), and is
one of the oldest peer-reviewed academic journals regarding the Byzantine Empire. In a 1929
article for the journal entitled “Les chrétiens sous les sultans (1553-1592): Un recueil de
documents turcs” [The Christians under the sultans (1553-1592): A collection of Turkish
documents], Laurent presents a collection of Ottoman state documents (translated from Ottoman
into French) from 1564 to 1585 discussing building prohibitions for churches in Constantinople,
or, “Stamboul,” as the city is referred to in the documents.52 About his findings, Laurent notes in
his commentary: “Regulations with religious character include almost all sanctions taken against
the non-Islamic communities...So, it is forbidden for the Christians to build [churches or other
Christian structures] near bulwarks or close to mosques…”53
Given the vast quantity of mosques and fortress walls across the city of Istanbul, these
specifications make it clear that the goal was to either reduce and/or eliminate physical Christian
sites and structures from the geospace of Istanbul. Additionally, churches were not allowed to
stand taller than mosques.54 This only allowed for the building of small chapels and prevented
the construction of medium- or large-sized churches or cathedrals, ultimately preventing the
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construction of spaces for assembly and gathering of the Greek Orthodox population, whether for
religious or other cultural purposes. This height limitation was made even more difficult given
the bell and dome structures of Byzantine-style churches, and implied a series of additional
complications designed to limit the use of religious and cultural heritage sites. One of the
documents that Laurent includes in his article mentions this restriction on height.
The following is an excerpt from a letter written by Sultan Suleiman I to an Ottoman
judge and an Ottoman architect in 1565 regarding churches in Balat (a historically Greek and
Jewish neighborhood in Istanbul) entitled “Pour la démolition de l’église construite
contrairement aux lois au delà de Balat Capou” (“For the destruction of the church constructed
contrary to laws hereafter of Balat Capou”):
The infidels/faithless sinners had recourse to my imperial throne to say that their church
constructed beyond by Balat Capou had been closed by key and the entrance forbidden in
accordance with my sacred order. And, having learnt that the church being discussed was
only a home before and that the infidels/faithless by adding a floor transformed it into
church, I ordered to demolish it and I loaded Ali with it. I enjoin you not to defer
accompanying it on places and to demolish all houses which would exceed the others in
height and not to allow that they act against my order. You will mean in the
infidels/faithless that they will not have to meet any more in this home to celebrate their
rituals, and it will at the same time recommend to the Muslims of neighborhood to inform
[the Ottoman authorities] in case the faithless would meet in the aforementioned home or
plan to construct other one.55
This excerpt is instructive in several ways. First, the letter notes the aforementioned height
policy and encapsulates the disturbing normalization of an imperial state policy of destruction of
Greek Orthodox churches and residences. Second, the language of the letter—for example, the
reference to Greek Orthodox Christians as “infidels/faithless sinners”—communicates the clear
theocratic structure of the Ottoman Empire and a theological perspective entrenched in notions
of socio-religious hierarchy and power. Third, the recommendation issued by the Sultan for the
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Muslims in the Balat neighborhood to inform the Ottoman authorities about their Christian
neighbors’ potential response communicates how the Ottoman state generated social mistrust and
fragmentation along communal lines, setting up Muslims as reporters of the state against their
Christian neighbors.
Historian George Georgiadis Arnakis also details these Ottoman state policies regarding
the construction and upkeep of churches in the Ottoman Empire in a 1944 article for The Journal
of Modern History:
In place of their old churches [which the Ottomans had converted into mosques] the
Greeks were allowed to build little, humble structures with wooden roofs. But it was not
easy to get such permission. In each case a fetva [an Islamic decree] had to be issued by
the ulema (doctors of Islamic theology), testifying that the new place of worship would
not be obnoxious to Islam or to the state. In addition to bribing several officials, it was
found necessary to distribute money among the Turkish families of the neighborhood so
that they would raise no objection to the building project. In due course the fetva would
be submitted to the sultan, who would grant a firman authorizing the petitioners to build
the church and to complete it within forty days. Under such circumstances it was hardly
possible for the Christians to have the right kind of church; customarily the roofing was
done on the fortieth day, with nails only half driven in.56
Even the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the seat of the Orthodox Church
worldwide, was victim to these policies. Arnakis writes: “The Patriarchate found shelter at first
in the Panagia at Xyloporta and later in St. Demetrius. Each of these churches was a poor
structure, housing a poverty-stricken organization. Finally, in 1603, St. George of Phanar became
the cathedral church, and it has remained the patriarch's seat until now. It was one of the small
churches which the Turks had not taken.”57
This was the general state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire for several centuries. In the
latter half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, two phenomena emerged that would
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critically change the landscape of Ottoman and Turkish nationalism and the facade of cultural
heritage policies. Living in an empire in serious decline, many young, educated, Ottoman elite
became increasingly disillusioned with the absolutist, authoritarian regime of Sultan Abdul
Hamid II during the last three decades of the 19th century.
Many of these elites—particularly those who had studied in Western Europe—adopted
the European intellectual trends of the period and imported them into the Ottoman
Empire. Theories of ethnic and racial nationalism were taking on authority in Europe, and
political youth movements like the Young Italy movement served as inspiration for a new
conceptualization of nationhood. This confluence of people and events led to the establishment
of the Young Turks. The movement was led primarily by Mehmed Talaat (“Talat Pasha”) and
Ismail Enver (“Enver Pasha”), who would become the de facto leaders of the Ottoman Empire
during World War I, and the architects of the Ottoman genocide against Christians.58
Meanwhile, in 1912 and 1913, the Balkan Wars provided the geopolitical complement to
the Young Turks’ ideological development. By the end of the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman
Empire had incurred significant territorial losses of the regions of Macedonia and Epirus, of
Albania and Kosovo, and of most of the region of Thrace, losing all remaining European
territories except for Constantinople and Eastern Thrace.59 While these territorial losses caused
structural changes, dealing the final deathblow to an already crumbling Ottoman Empire, they
also produced equally serious demographic changes in the composition and identity and
demographic geospace of the Empire. This period produced a crucial change in the two kinds of
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geographies—one, a compression or truncation in the territorial geography in the empire, and a
concomitant change in the ethno-religious composition and demography of the empire—that
affected the consolidation of an exclusivist form of nationalism that would have direct
implications for cultural heritage. This shrinking in geographic footprint carried with it a
reduction of ethnic diversity in the Ottoman citizenry, and, coupled with the ethnic and racial
nationalism brewed by the Young Turks, created the foundations for Kemalism, an ethnic- and
race-based form of nationalism that would dictate the policies and practices of the early
Republic.
Just as the Ottoman Empire, itself, dissolved, so too did the Young Turks’
movement. The Balkan Wars and First World War created rifts within the Young Turks’
movement, but one member of the movement would become a decisive actor in Turkish
history. Eventually, Mustafa Kemal “Atatürk,” an ethnically Turkish Sunni Muslim born in
Thessaloniki (a city in modern-day Greece), would become the founder of the Republic of
Turkey.60 Kemal’s impact on the nationalist project of the new state of Turkey was so
determinant that Turkish nationalism and Kemalism would be used interchangeably. The reality
is that the Kemalists are the byproduct, inheritors, and final articulation of the Young Turks’
conceptualizations and policies, fully operationalizing the ideas of Turkification that the Young
Turks had developed and begun to execute in the Christian genocide.
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Part II: State-Making and the Kemalist Theory of Nationalism
By the 1920s and 1930s, the work of the European intellectual class of the previous
decades had begun to seriously influence the political space of various states and societies across
the world, occupying a central space in various developing nationalist ideologies. There
emerged a clear identification of the connection between territorial space, identity and culture,
and state control in the nationalist projects of many dominant political parties and
movements. Central to this particular model of nationalism was a common and all-important
characteristic: the construction of an ideal-type citizen, who embodies the ontological,
constitutive features of the nation as a whole.
Whether it was the Sabra Jew or the Herrenrasse, the ideal-type citizen was formulated
and defined in terms of primordial, essentialist features that could be expressed in ethnic,
religious, and linguistic forms. Insofar as this ideal-type citizen was understood in such
primordial, essentialist, putatively immutable identity features/terms, citizens who did not
possess those features were, de facto, either other, or less than, both in social hierarchies of
power, and in terms of relationship to the state. Kemalism would become one of the most
exemplary incarnations of this model of nationalism, codifying an ideal-type Turkish citizen in
foundational Turkish state doctrine and elucidating the clear separation and inferiority of nonideal-type Turkish citizens.
Named for its ideological founder and leader, Mustafa Kemal, Kemalism was the original
dominant nationalist ideology of the Turkish Republic.61 Kemalism was the foundation for
various state laws and policies that would come to symbolize the fundamental ideological nature
of the Republic and that are still in use today. Many in the broad historiography laud Kemalism
61

Suna Kili, “Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey,” International Political Science Review 1, no.
3, Political Ideology: Its Impact on Contemporary Political Transformations (1980), 381-404.

29
as a chiefly positive movement and ideology—a breakthrough modernization theory that would
both orient Turkey more towards the West and broadly reform and secularize Turkish state and
society, creating more social cohesion and equality before the law.62 Indeed, the notion of
reform was central to Kemalist philosophy and policy execution; it was under Kemalism that the
Turkish state replaced Ottoman script with the Latin-based new Turkish alphabet in an effort to
align with the West,63 and Atatürk’s Kemalist regime supported scientific exploration and free
public education.64
Such an overwhelming exaltation of the ideology, however, overlooks the deeply
discriminatory and racist core of Kemalism. Just as importantly, there exists a general
historiographic failure to address the paradoxical, contradictory nature of Kemalism. That is,
Kemalism, itself, aimed to fashion a cosmopolitan, civilized, Western-friendly version of the
Ottoman Empire in the form of the new, progressive, Kemalist Turkish Republic. In reality,
many Kemalist policies—particularly secularization policies—were effectively Ottoman policies
written with different language (language which was representative of the Westphalian state
system). At the same time that Kemalists used nationalist policy to exclude, subjugate, and
punish Greek Orthodox Christians in Turkey, the Kemalists also appropriated the very cultural
heritage of the Greek Orthodox population to recover from the anointing of the Ottoman Empire
as the “sick man of Europe”65 at the end of the 19th century and present a more Western-oriented
Turkish Republic.
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In this section, we examine the ideological foundations of Kemalism through an
examination of Turkish anthropological publications. An investigation into the theory of
Kemalism is necessary if we are to understand the meaning and intents of the application and
operationalization of the ideology, something to which the following section is dedicated.
Whereas Ottoman imperial statemakers drew on Islamic law to organize their society, the
new Turkish statemakers sought to replace (and simultaneously incorporate) their Ottoman
predecessor’s theories with a new, scientific, state-sanctioned codex for social organization and
national identity. The most clear encapsulation of this came in the form of the Turkish Review of
Anthropology, an academic journal which was published between 1925 and 1939 by the Faculty
of Medicine at the University of Istanbul, who went on to form the Anthropology Institute of
Turkey.66 The Review was the first state-funded academic journal, and served as the main
method of output for the growing Turkish anthropological community. Social anthropology in
Turkey developed in an “atmosphere of nationalistic purpose,”67 and the primary objective of the
Institute was to “contribute to the development of the Kemalist thesis of history: to research the
cultural origins, historical development, and physical characteristics of the Turkish
people.”68 The implications for cultural heritage would quickly become clear.
It is in this specific environment, then, and with these specific objectives, that
anthropology, as an academic discipline in Turkey, was first developed and disseminated. The
Institute simultaneously served as the perfect incubator and official intellectual legitimizer for
Kemalist ethno-religious ideology and the Kemalist ideal-type citizen. As historian Nazan
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Maksudyan writes, the Institute “used willing academics to legitimize a racist type of nationalism
by appealing to (and abusing) the language and methods of science.”69 Under the guise of
scientific rationalism and empiricism, the Review asked and answered several questions: Who is
Turkish? What does it mean to be a Turk? Mustafa Kemal, himself, applauded the Institute on
the first edition of the Review, and also reiterated the objectives of the Institute in a letter to the
Faculty, writing: “I wish success to the institute in its valuable work which targets the aim of
investigating the Turk.”70 Maksudyan writes that the Review presented “a dominating and
exclusionary discourse of Turkish nationalism, in which the ‘Turkish race’ (posited as the
dominant national group) had a sense of proprietary ownership of the nation and national
identity.”71
The so-called “anthropologists” behind the Review were, themselves, in fact, medical
doctors, who had “recently begun to present themselves as anthropologists.”72 Many of these
doctors, such as Şevket Aziz Kansu, the director of the Institute,73 studied and worked in
European university laboratories and researched the connections between anatomy and
physiology, race, and nationalism—the intersection of foci and phenomena that is essentially at
the core of the discipline of eugenics. Kansu’s work in Paris specifically dealt with “the
morphology of the skulls of Neo-Caledonians and African Negroes.”74
This state support for and application of “science” corresponded to the overall Kemalist
project, not only in terms of the ideological legitimation but also in terms of the aforementioned
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support of science by Kemalists. This support for “science,” though, is yet another moment in
which constructed perception and reality sit distantly from one another in the broad scope of
Kemalism. This distance between perception and reality, however, worked purposefully for the
Kemalist’s construction of an exclusivist nationalism. As Maksudyan writes:
...the understanding of science in the Turkish context was superficial. The meaning of
science, scientific research, and scientific inquiry remained quite far-off to many
intellectuals and political elites. Much of the effort in the field of scientific research was
directly subject to the hegemony of nationalist ideology. In the context of the Republic, it
was possible to attach truth to virtually anything under the disguise of a scientific
argument. In fact, science was utilized by the Republican elites in a very subtle manner in
order to suggest that scientific findings dictated the only right way of solving the
problems; and therefore, to suppress any questioning of policies undertaken by the
scientific state of Turkey. In this respect, the Turkish Review of Anthropology was
founded to prove myths about the Turkish race by using positivist methods of physical
anthropology. Anthropology was considered to be a perfect tool to convey in a scientific
manner truths about the Turkish race that were no more than nationalist inventions.75
The first edition of the Review includes an article entitled “Comparative Analysis of the Turkish
Race and Other Races Living in Istanbul.” The ideas and objectives of the Review are clear from
this first article; the authors identify the Turk as “the master of the country.”76 In discussing the
minority populations, the authors write: “The Greeks, the Jews and the Armenians have been
living here for a long time…”77 This use of language creates a master-subject, host-guest
dichotomy, wherein the minorities are presented as the interlopers and the Turks as the eternal
masters. This sort of writing aids not only in the Kemalist mission of constructing a seemingly
natural, de facto hierarchical order of Turkish society in which the minority groups are inferior,
but also in the development of an alternative, non-factual account of history. The authors
described ethnic Turks, or, in their writing, the Turkish race, to have the “purest
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blood.”78 Meanwhile, they identified the Greeks of Turkey as “the descendants of a mongrel
race...the result of successive affixes and varied mixture, whose proportioning could not be
scientifically established.”79
The authors also attempted to assert their ethnic/racial superiority based on physical
characteristics, writing that Turks had a “more vigorous maintenance of health,” which, as
Maksudyan writes, in the “context of their physical-racial anthropology simply meant that the
Turks had a better genetic standing, eugenically.”80 This superior “maintenance of health”
conclusion was based on data collected which measured the height and weight of ethnically
Turkish and ethnically Greek children in the early Republic; on average, the Turkish children
were taller and heavier than the Greek children.81 The authors comment on their measurements:
“The crucial point is that the Turkish child always displays a much higher weight than the
children of the different races, settled in Istanbul. Will this superiority be visible in
adulthood?”82 The expression of these physical differences on a conceptual level of
“superiority” speaks to the overarching objective of the Review in delineating a superiorityinferiority dichotomy, in which ethnic Turks occupy the superior and ethnic Greeks occupy the
inferior. The authors also connect the issue of physical characteristics to intellectual capabilities,
mapping greater height and weight onto greater intelligence.83
It is also worth noting that, throughout the “Comparative Analysis” article, the data is
always presented as the “Turkish race” vis-à-vis “other races.” That is, the Greeks, Armenians,
Jews, and Levantines that constitute the “other races” are not compared to one another
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independent of the Turks. This conceptualization and structural organization of data further
reinforces the subjugation and othering of minority groups from the ethnically Turkish
population.
The Kemalist nationalist project (master race ideology, and superiority-inferiority
dichotomy) was thus carefully developed and broadcasted by the vessel of the Turkish Review of
Anthropology. These ideas, developed under the guise of scientific authority and serious
academic theorizing, created the foundational rhetoric for Kemalist ideologues. The exclusivism
at the crux of Kemalism is excellently summed up by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, who served as
justice minister from 1924 to 1930, in a statement to the Haimiyet-i Milliye, National Sovereignty
Newspaper in 1930: “This party [Kemalist Republican People’s Party], by the works it
accomplished heretofore, restored to the Turkish nation its position that is essentially the
master. My idea, my opinion is that...the master of this country is the Turk. Those who are not
genuine Turks can have only one right in the Turkish fatherland, and that is to be a servant, to be
a slave.”84

Part III: Cultural Heritage Policy and Nation-Building
If the Turkish anthropological community was the ideal intellectual laboratory for the
Kemalist’s exclusivist nationalist project, then it was the early Turkish state that operationalized
those frameworks in the form of cultural heritage policies. Turkish cultural heritage expert
Çiğdem Atakuman writes, “national identities are continuously re-configured within heritage
discourses.”85 In this section, we explore how Atatürk and his Republican People’s Party
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promulgated the Kemalist-constructed Turkish national identity through cultural heritage policies
which spanned the tangible and the intangible. Atatürk Devrimleri,86 or, Atatürk’s Reforms,
were the policies which governed the early Republic and worked under the cover of
secularization to further exclude Greek Orthodox Christians and other non-ideal-type citizens
from Turkish society. One of the central foci of these reforms was cultural heritage; most
notably, the reforms dealt with cultural property, education, and language.

Cultural Property
As part of the transition from empire to modern state, Atatürk oversaw the creation of
numerous state institutions that regulated the legal activities of various ethno-religious
groups. Two major federal institutions were established which still exist today: the Diyanet
İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs), which is often referred to simply as the
Diyanet; and the Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü (Directorate General of Foundations), which is often
referred to simply as the Vakıflar. The Diyanet replaced the Ottoman office of the Sheikh alIslam, which was the highest Ottoman religious authority and was abolished by the Türkiye
Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly) in 1923.87
Although the Diyanet is the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet only actually
deals with Islamic education and Islamic religious administration.88 The administration of all
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other religious groups falls under the jurisdiction of the Vakıflar.89 This distinction and
separation alone are indicative of the othering of ethno-religious minorities in Turkey—while
Islam, the preferred religion of the state, is attached to “religious affairs,” Christianity, Judaism,
and all other religions are considered to be “foundations.”
A section of the Diyanet’s official website entitled “Establishment and a Brief History”
begins with the following statement: “It is obvious that, in any case, a corporal identity is needed
to carry out religious affairs pertaining to faith, which is an indispensable element of social
life.”90 Here the intentionality of the Kemalist’s policies is laid bare; despite the “secular” ideals
of Kemalism, the Diyanet was created as an essential institution to oversee the “indispensable”
role of religion in Turkish life. And yet, the apparently unquestionable importance and quotidian
presence of religion in Turkish society is only valid when it is in the form of the preferred
religion of the state: Sunni Islam. With the establishment and separation of the Diyanet and
Vakıflar, all non-Sunni religious groups were completely and facilely excluded from the official
realm of religion in Turkey, and, in the process, invalidated on a purely existence-based level.
While the mere existence and institutional separation of the Diyanet and the Vakıflar
convey the other and inferior status of ethno-religious minorities in Turkey, the actual policy
impact of the institutions on the destruction and appropriation of minority groups’ cultural
property must also be discussed. Ottoman practices regarding ethno-religious property such as
the ones discussed in Part I of this chapter served as the foundational, albeit far looser and less
systematized, modus operandi for Kemalist cultural property policies. The Kemalists also
adopted a core attitude towards cultural property from their Ottoman predecessors that was
89
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central to their policymaking method: property as a symbol of Ottoman/Turkish/Islamic
conquest.
Scores of Greek Orthodox cultural properties had already been confiscated during the
long Ottoman period; Orthodox churches and schools were most often converted into mosques,
public toilets, stables, or residential spaces for ethnic Turks and Sunni Muslims.91 With the
materialization of the newfound administrative authority of the Vakıflar, however, confiscation
of ethno-religious minorities’ cultural property became much more systemized under the nascent
Turkish state. Because cultural property belonging to non-Muslims did not fall under the
jurisdictional umbrella of the Diyanet, all such property was transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Vakıflar.
Vakıflar policies required that, in order for a particular group or individual to claim and
possess ownership of a cultural property, the group or individual was required to present
evidence of previous ownership.92 This, however, was a difficult task for ethno-religious
minorities, whose properties—during the long Ottoman period—were not previously registered
under the Ottoman office of the Sheikh al-Islam due to the fact that they did not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Islamic millets.93 This specific system intentionally created difficulties for
ethno-religious minority communities and was part of what anthropologist Tuğba TanyeriErdemir calls the “very interesting grey area...that defines the Turkish cultural regime.”94 As a
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result, Greek Orthodox Christians and Greek Orthodox cultural organizations were unable to
claim ownership of their rightful and historic properties.
In an interview, Tanyeri-Erdemir pointed out to me a connected difficulty that the Greek
Orthodox community faced in securing ownership of their own cultural property throughout the
early Republican period, citing the spillover effects of the Ottoman’s genocide against
Christians. Tanyeri-Erdemir describes the early Republic as “a whole country of Christian
remains that don’t have any owners.”95 Indeed, as millions of Greek Orthodox Christian subjects
were murdered or forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands in Turkey, a multitude of
properties, such as homes, cemeteries, orphanages, schools, chapels, community centers, and
agricultural fields, were abandoned and left without owners and administrators.96 In many
Ottoman documents from the 1910s and 1920s detailing the issue of how to redistribute property
which previously belonged to Greek Orthodox subjects, the Greek Orthodox Christians were
often simply referred to as the “disappeared people” (eşhās-ı mütegayyibe).97 The strategic use
of language conveys two things about the Greek Orthodox subjects (in the Ottoman’s presented
and fictitious narrative): first, that they quite simply “disappeared” without explanation (i.e.,
Ottoman-perpetrated genocide and forcible displacement), and, second, that they somewhat
voluntarily abandoned their land (i.e., being killed and forcibly displaced and thus being forced
to abandon their land).
The late Ottoman administration claimed, during the aforementioned time period, that
they had compiled property records (tahsis defterleri) on provincial bases in order to log
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ownership of properties which belonged to Greek Orthodox subjects.98 It is unclear what, if
anything, the Ottoman state administration communicated to the Ottoman public in terms of their
objectives (besides organizational) of compiling these property records. It was not clear whether
the Ottoman administration intended to give the ownership rights of these newly abandoned
properties to Greek Orthodox organizations such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate, based in
Constantinople, or simply expropriate ownership rights for the Ottoman protostate.99 Regardless, in recent years, scholars “actually found the [property] registers to be largely
fictitious.”100 This communicates the true intentions of the late Ottoman administration in
regards to Greek Orthodox property: to ensure no written record of previous property ownership
by Greek Orthodox Christians, and thus prevent future individuals or groups from citing their
ownership rights. Consequently, such properties were expropriated by the Vakıflar, becoming
the de facto property of the Turkish state.101 Taken as a whole, the Ottoman state constructed the
legal template and institutional foundations for a discriminatory property rights regime and
cultural heritage regime vis-à-vis the Greek Orthodox community that continued with the
Kemalist’s establishment of the Turkish state.
In a 2009 study entitled “The Story of an Alien(ation): Real Estate Ownership Problems
of Non-Muslim Foundations and Communities in Turkey,” Turkish legal and human rights
experts Dilek Kurban and Kezban Hatemi provide lists of cultural property and foundations in
Istanbul which were seized by the Turkish government.102 While the seizure of these properties
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spanned from the 1930s to the 1990s, the seizure was made possible and legally acceptable by
provisions in the Atatürk-era 1936 Property and Foundations Declaration.103
Kurban and Hatemi’s data is a compilation of their own independent research and their
collaboration with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the late Turkish-Armenian
journalist and Agos newspaper editor-in-chief Hrant Dink.104 This data details the Turkish
government’s seizure of 24 entire Greek Orthodox foundations (in this context, the term
“foundations” is used in the manner of the Turkish state’s legal designatory term discussed at the
beginning of this subsection).105 The foundations included schools, orphanages, churches,
monasteries, and an entire district in the Balat neighborhood of Istanbul that had a high
concentration of Greek Orthodox homes, chapels, and community centers.106
The data also identifies the Turkish government’s seizure of almost 1,000 Greek
Orthodox immovables.107 In this context, the term “immovables” denotes properties which are
not necessarily related to, owned by, or administered by Greek Orthodox “foundations” (i.e. a
Greek Orthodox orphanage, a church under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, etc.).
“Immovables” more broadly include properties owned by Greek Orthodox citizens and residents
of Turkey or properties loosely affiliated with the Greek Orthodox population of Turkey. Some
immovables did, however, belong to official Greek Orthodox organizations and institutions. The
following is a sampling of immovables which were seized from the Balıklı Greek Hospital
Foundation: “…157 houses, 26 garden houses, 21 apartment buildings, 3 buildings, 6 flats, 66
shops, 2 commercial buildings, 1 nail plant, 1 soft drink plant, 2 hotels, 1 meeting venue, 1
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nightclub, 1 cabaret, 2 music halls, 2 warehouses, 1 workshop, 26 pieces of land, 1 field, 2
vineyards, 2 vegetable gardens, 1 orchard, 3 cemeteries.”108 These immovables were scattered
across a variety of neighborhoods in Istanbul: Fatih, Beyoğlu, Şişli, Beşiktaş, Eminönü, Kadıköy,
Üsküdar, Adalar, Bakırköy, Zeytinburnu.109 This is only one grouping of the nearly 1,000
immovables that Kurban and Hatemi found in their research, conveying the massive scope and
impact of Kemalist cultural property and foundations policies.

Education
The Kemalists also operationalized their nationalist ideology into cultural heritage policy
in the realm of the intangible. This is crystallized in the national educational system, which
became a communal, public sector outpost for Kemalist state ideology. Anne-Christine Hoff, in
a 2018 article for the Middle East Forum, describes the educational system in Turkey as “a
political arm of the state ever since Atatürk founded the Turkish republic in the 1920s.”110
Indeed, one of Atatürk’s major reforms was that of educational reform, most clearly articulated
in the creation of a unified, state-designed and -mandated national curriculum in all public
schools. The imposition of such a curriculum was made possible by the 1924 enactment of the
Law on the Unification of Education.111 The passing of this law had a similar state-centralizing
effect as the establishment of the Diyanet and the Vakıflar; that is, the law placed all private and
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public schools under the control of the federal government and imposed a universal state
curriculum on all schools.112
One of the core features of the nationwide curriculum that the Kemalists designed and
implemented was that of security courses. Security courses were mandatory for all primary and
secondary school students in Turkish public schools from 1926 to 2012.113 The official names of
the security courses changed over time—“Military Service,” “Preparation for Military Service,”
“National Defense Knowledge,” “Studies in National Security”—but the content and source
material were universal and remained largely consistent.114 The courses were taught by active or
retired military officers who were paid by the Ministry of National Education, the Milli Eğitim
Bakanlığı.115 The military courses and military officers were used to present Turkish students
with an image of the Turkish military as a “natural extension of national character,”116 and as an
instructive group on the issue of Turkishness.
Turkish cultural anthropologist Ayşe Gül Altınay provides a critical survey and analysis
of the security courses in her article, “Human Rights or Militarist Ideals? Teaching National
Security in High Schools.” In her investigation of the textbooks used in the military courses,
Altınay finds explicitly exclusivist nationalist and discriminatory language, and the clear
delineation of the “other” in Turkish society. Altınay writes:
...Examples of discimination (particularly those based on ethnicity and religion) and of
xenophobia can be found in the section that discusses Turkey’s geopolitical uniqueness,
its relations with neighboring countries, and its ‘internal’ enemies, titled ‘The Games
112
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Played Over Turkey...’ The ‘activities’ that seek to divide Turkey along the lines of race,
religion or religious sect are presented as the major threats to the democratic and secular
regime of the country. It is argued, over and over, throughout the textbook, that those
who claim to belong to a different race are the ‘divisive elements’ (bölücü unsurlar) that
promote racial discrimination in society and are supported by Turkey’s enemies [Greece,
Armenia, Israel], not by the Turkish people themselves.117
The curriculum for elementary school students, specifically, includes learning about subjectspecific vocabulary such as the words “struggle,” “martyr,” and “veteran.”118 In her article,
Altınay notes, however, that there is no mention of learning words such as “peace,” “coexistence,” “dialogue,” or “nonviolence” in the curricular teaching outlines.119 The curricular
teaching outlines also state that students must be informed that ethnic Turks are members of a
“heroic race,” and that non-ethnic Turks living in Turkey are “internal enemies.”120 Altınay
elaborates on the damaging effects of security courses on Turkish youth:
They are encouraged to...fear all differences, remaining blind to the differences among
their Muslim friends and treating their non-Muslim friends as categorically different (in
fact, as non-Turkish); regard all dissent within Turkey as having an ‘external’ origin (and
thus, non-authentic, non-Turkish)...This [educational] approach leads to the
‘securitization,’ and by extension militarization, of not only politics, but also the concept
of ‘everyday life.’121
The exclusivist face of Kemalist ideology in education was not, however, limited to the realm of
security courses. Until 2013, all students in all public and private primary schools (including
minority-administered private schools such as Greek and Armenian schools) were required to
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recite the “Student Oath” (Öğrenci Andı) every morning.122123 Reşit Galip, who served as
Minister of National Education from 1932 to 1933 and served as a Minister of Parliament,
composed the oath, whose recitation went into practice on 23 April 1933.124 The oath reads:
I am a Turk, I am right, I am hardworking, my principle is to protect young people, to
respect the elders, to love my country and my nation more than my soul. My ideal is to
advance and go further. Dear Grand Atatürk, I take the oath to walk without stopping
towards the target you have shown us, on the path that you have opened for us. My
presence is a present to the presence of Turks. Happy is the person who says ‘I am
Turk.’125126
Given the Kemalist ideation of “Turkishness” as an identity marker constituted solely by an
individual’s ethnic identity, this oath required students who were not ethnic Turks to essentially
denounce their ethnic background. Additionally, the required recitation of the oath further
reinforced the militant attitude towards ethno-religious minorities which was achieved by the
security courses. In a 2009 report written by international human rights lawyer Nurcan Kaya and
published by the Minority Rights Group International, an Alevi-Kurdish school teacher described
his childhood experience with the oath: “‘Every time when I was reading the oath I felt scared. It
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was read in a very militarist way, we were standing in line and one of us would screamingly read
it. I was a Kurd at home and I was becoming a Turk at school, I was confused.’”127
In her research, Kaya also found examples of Kemalist exclusivist thought in other
contexts. A widely-used state-written linguistics textbook, for example, described the sound of
the Greek language as “similar to the sound of a snake.”128 A widely-used history textbook
which was also written by the state, meanwhile, includes a section on ethno-religious diversity in
the Ottoman Empire prior to the enactment of Kemalist policies in the modern Republic. One
part of this section reads: “people [Ottomans] were dressing according to their religion, nation,
profession, being urban dwellers or villagers. This has affected human relations negatively and
caused disorder.”129 The history textbook also states that students must strictly adhere to
Kemalism: “Deviation from the Kemalist system of thought endangers democracy and the
sovereignty of the nation. Therefore, in order to maintain its sovereignty, the Turkish nation
should never abjure democracy.”130

Language
Also in the realm of intangible cultural heritage in Kemalist Turkey is the implementation
of language policies and initiatives. Several policies enacted during the long Kemalist period
prohibited minority groups from speaking their native languages in public spaces, thereby aiding
in the destruction of the linguistic heritage of ethno-religious minorities. A student of Turkish
Republican or 20th century European history might take issue with this—were there not multiple
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provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne131 to ensure language rights for ethno-religious minorities132
in Turkey? Indeed, Articles 40 and 41 of the Treaty are as follows:
Article 40: Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they
shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any
charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for
instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their
own religion freely therein.133
Article 41: As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those
towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Muslim nationals are
resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall
be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own
language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the
teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.134
Unfortunately, the Turkish state, since its inaugural Kemalist administration, has failed to
comply with its responsibilities and requirements delineated in the treaty and denied its citizens
their language rights. There is an erroneous notion widely present in the historiography which
argues that Turkish state policies regarding language did not come into being until the
ratification of the Turkish Constitution of 1982, and that the Kemalists did not participate in
language prohibition. Despite the numerous amendments and revisions made to the 1982
Constitution, Article 42 of the Constitution, which explicitly prohibits the teaching of languages
other than Turkish in all public and private educational institutions, remains intact and

131

The Treaty of Lausanne was a French-brokered peace treaty which negotiated the terms of the
legal status of minorities in the newly established Turkish state. The treaty was signed on 24
July 1923 and went into effect on 6 August 1924.
132
The Treaty only recognized non-Muslims as minorities in Turkey. This is rife with
implications for the non-Sunni Muslim groups in Turkey. This is an incredibly important issue,
albeit one which cannot be explored within the confines of this thesis.
133
Ali Bardakoğlu, “Culture of Co-existence in Islam: The Turkish Case,” Insight Turkey 10, no.
3 (2008): 120.
134
Ibid.

47
unchanged: “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish
citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions
of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and
education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international
treaties are reserved.”135
While this 1982 constitutional article explicitly codified the prohibition of foreign
languages within the specific realm of education, exclusivist Turkish state and municipal
language policies date back to the core Kemalist period of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1924, with
the passing of the Law on the Unification of Education, the Turkish parliament enacted a policy
which required ethno-religious minority schools to teach at least five hours of Turkish language
per week.136 Certain early Kemalist language policies, such as this one, corresponded with a
base-level nation-building goal of using language as a national unifier (including the capacity to
read national history and communicate in a shared language). Subsequent language policies,
however, were implemented to silence minorities in the public sphere and build exclusivist
nationalism.
Later in 1924, the municipal government of Bursa enacted a policy that prohibited people
from speaking any language other than Turkish in public areas, and imposed fines on violators of
this policy.137 In 1926, the Turkish parliament enacted a policy which required all teachers in

135

Kutlay Yağmur, “Languages in Turkey,” in The Other Languages of Europe: Demographic,
Sociolinguistic, and Educational, ed. Guus Extra and Durk Gorter (London: Cromwell Press,
2001), 423.
136
Senem Aslan, “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’: A Nation in the Making,” Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics 13, no. 2 (2007): 251.
137
Ayşe Hür, “Türkiye’nin ‘Öz Dil’ Zorbalığı Serüveni” [“Turkey's 'Self Language' Bullying
Adventure”], Haksöz Haber, 26 February 2012, https://www.haksozhaber.net/turkiyenin-oz-dilzorbaligi-seruveni-28018h.htm.

48
minority schools to have Turkish as their native language.138 In the same year, the Turkish
parliament passed a law which prohibited corporations from using any language other than
Turkish in any corporate correspondence.139 The Settlement Law of 1934 banned people whose
mother tongue was not Turkish from establishing villages or districts.140
The Citizen, speak Turkish! (vatandaş Türkçe konuş!) campaign is one of the most
notable examples of these policies on the national level. The campaign, which aimed to
“eradicate the public visibility and audibility of non-Turkish languages,”141 was initiated by the
Law Faculty Student’s Association at Istanbul University on 14 January 1928.142 This campaign
affected a significant portion of the population of Istanbul; according to the Turkish national
census of 1927, approximately 28% of the population of Istanbul did not have Turkish as their
native language.143 Among this group, Greek was the language with the highest number of
native speakers (92,000 people).144 In her article, “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’: A Nation in the
Making,” Turkish political scientist Senem Aslan details the development of the campaign and
highlights the active role and contributions of the Kemalist state in the campaign. Aslan writes:
In their congress, the students [in the Law Faculty Student’s Association at Istanbul
University] claimed that speaking in a language other than Turkish meant not recognizing
Turkish law and sentiments and that those who do not speak Turkish could not be
regarded as good citizens. Within the association, they formed a separate committee for
the organization of the campaign, which started officially after the Ministry of Interior
granted permission. In the following days, the Turkish Hearths invited the leaders of the
students to discuss the campaign, and they formed a “Commission for the Protection and
Expansion of Turkish Language” within the Hearths to teach Turkish all over the country
and to inspect schools to ensure that there was proper Turkish education. On 26 January
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1928, the Commission decided to arrange meetings with the owners of newspapers
published in foreign languages to ask for their support. Celal Sair Bey, a member of the
board of directors of Turkish Hearths, met with the mayor of Istanbul who promised to
help the campaign. The Ministry of Education offered 1000 Turkish liras in support of
the campaign. As the state’s support of the campaign indicates, the students’ initiative
was in conformity with the official language policy. The spread of a common and
standardized national language had been one of the main concerns of the state elite from
the beginning of the Republic.145
The campaign, which, as Aslan notes, was a cooperative effort of the students at Istanbul
University and the Kemalist state, quickly spread beyond Istanbul. A local newspaper in Izmir
published an advertisement for the campaign in 1928 that read: “Citizen, do not make friends
with or shop from those so-called Turkish citizens who do not speak Turkish. We request from
our lady citizens who work as telephone operators: Please immediately cut off conversations in
Greek and Latino [sic.].”146 Signs bearing the statement, “Citizens! Let’s speak Turkish.
Speaking Turkish is a national duty. A Turk speaks Turkish,” were hung in busses, trolleys,
theatres, and restaurants across Istanbul, Izmir, and Edirne.147 Rıfat Bali, a Turkish author and
advocate of ethno-religious minorities in Turkey, said that “speaking in a language other than
Turkish had become nearly impossible in public during the campaign because of the risk of
verbal harassment and even physical attack.”148 Many newspaper editors published columns
during throughout the campaign stating that, as long as the Turkish state allowed ethno-religious
minorities “to have separate schools, orphanages, and charitable foundations, their inclusion into
the Turkish nation would be impossible.”149

145

Aslan, “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’”, 251.
Ibid, 245.
147
Ibid, 253.
148
Ibid, 254.
149
Ibid, 255.
146

50
The campaign continued successfully into the 1930s; in 1935, Ismet Inönü, the Prime
Minister of Turkey, dedicated a speech to the issue of exclusively speaking Turkish. Inönü
stated: “From now on we will not keep quiet. All citizens who live with us will speak
Turkish.”150 By 1936, the municipal governments of Ankara, Adana, Diyarbakır, Kırklareli,
Edirne, Lüleburgaz, and Tekirdağ had also enacted policies which fined anyone who spoke a
language other than Turkish in public.151 Atatürk, himself, stated in a 1931 speech: “A person
who says he belongs to the Turkish nation should in the first place and under all circumstances
speak Turkish. It is not possible to believe a person’s claims that he belongs to the Turkish
nation and to Turkish culture if he does not speak Turkish.”152
The nationalist ideology and tangible and intangible cultural heritage policies of the
Kemalists were massively successful in destroying the presence of the Greek Orthodox
community in Turkey. The Kemalist state’s appropriation, expropriation, and destruction of
Greek Orthodox properties not only weakened the institutional strength and capabilities of
Turkey’s Greek Orthodox community, but also erased much of the cultural and historical record
of the community in Turkey. The Kemalist state’s villainization of Greek Orthodox Christians in
the national educational system, and elimination of the Greek language in the public space not
only silenced the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey, but rendered Greek Orthodox
Christians non-existent to their fellow Turkish citizens. The ideology and policies of the
Kemalists, which made it impossible for ethno-religious minorities to actualize their identities in
both the public square and the private sphere, have been maintained and, in many cases,
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expanded upon. Despite this continuity in exclusivist nationalism and cultural heritage policies,
Turkey’s exclusivist nationalism has been adapted by a new ideologue: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
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CHAPTER THREE: REVIVAL OF EMPIRE

The election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his conservative populist Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or, AKP) was initially understood as a break
from the “secular” Kemalist nationalism of the 20th century. Just as importantly, the election of
Erdoğan sparked hope that Turkey was ushering a new era of democratic ideals. Erdoğan, who
had served as mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998 and co-founded the AKP in 2001, was, with
his party, elected Prime Minister of Turkey in 2003.153 In a May 2003 article for the New York
Times Magazine, Deborah Sontag profiled Erdoğan and his pathway to the premiership:
Tayyip Erdoğan was an experiment for Turkey with ramifications that went well beyond
Turkey. As a devout Muslim with an Islamist past who had nonetheless evolved into a
modern, pro-Western democrat, Erdoğan had the potential to set a powerful example for
the region. If he could ease Turks into a less hostile separation of mosque and state, if he
could help Turkey undertake long-overdue democratic reforms, then perhaps one day he
would exemplify a way in which Islamic faith and democratic principles not only
coexisted but also collaborated.154
Two decades, one attempted military coup, and countless human rights violations later,
any hope surrounding Erdoğan and his leadership has decidedly disappeared. In August 2020,
The Guardian published an article entitled, “Erdoğan is both a bully and a menace. Europe
ignores him at its peril.”155 In March 2021, Eurasia Group founder and president Ian Bremmer,
writing for Time Magazine, penned an article entitled, “How Erdodan’s Increasingly Erratic Rule
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in Turkey Presents a Risk to the World.”156 In November 2020, former Erdoğan ally and current
Turkish political opposition leader Ahmet Davutoğlu went so far as to say that the Turkish
President was “more dangerous than Covid-19.”157
Currently, Erdoğan—who consolidated his presidential powers following a controversial
constitutional referendum in 2016158—has few supporters both domestically and abroad. Similar
conclusions have been reached regarding Erdoğan’s nationalist ideology and complementary
cultural heritage policies. In a Center for American Progress report on Turkish nationalism in
the Erdoğan period, the authors cite “Turkey’s current brand of populist nationalism...and
conservative nationalism.”159
Despite this general consensus on Erdoğan’s brand of nationalism and cultural heritage
policies, a consensus is still absent about whether his nationalism and policies constitute a
rupture or a continuity in the longue durée of Turkish history. The articulation of the past two
decades as an explicitly religious form of nationalism with authoritarian politics has been
characterized by some as a break with the “secular” nationalism and democratic regime of the
Kemalists. In fact, a more careful analysis, based on my critical review of both Kemalist and
Erdoğanist nationalism, illustrates that there are very important elements of continuity. These
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elements of continuity are most clearly expressed in a reiteration of nationalism as highly
exclusivist in ethno-religious terms. Erdoğan’s nationalism is simply a reconfiguration of
Kemalist nationalism.
Writing for the Jewish News Syndicate, Efrat Aviv discusses how Turkey’s current
exclusivist nationalism and cultural heritage policies are not a departure, but rather a
continuation, of its historic record in the aptly-titled article “Turkey continues to honor its
racists.” Aviv writes:
In November 2020, the Istanbul metropolitan municipality, led by Turkey’s main
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), named a park in Istanbul after Hüseyin
Nihal Astız. Astız (1905-1975) was an unabashed racist anti-Semite, Turkey’s most
prominent Nazi sympathizer and one of the most controversial figures in the history of
Turkish political thought...Naming public spaces after ultra-nationalist or racist figures is
not new in Turkey. In 1998, Fenerbahçe Stadium, a football arena located in the Kadiköy
district of Istanbul, was named after Fenerbahçe’s legendary chairman (1934-1950) and
Turkey’s fifth prime minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu [Saracoğlu was also a famed anti-Semite
and Nazi sympathizer].160
The broad focus of this chapter is an exploration of the intersection of the nationalism
and cultural heritage policies of the Erdoğan period, from 2001 to the present, and the effect of
this intersection on the Greek Orthodox minority community in Turkey. In this chapter, I also
identify elements of ideological and policy continuity to demonstrate how Erdoğanist
nationalism is, in fact, a continuation of Kemalist nationalism operating under a reconfigured
brand. In the same fashion as my previous chapter, I have divided this chapter into three parts.
In Part I, we begin with an exploration of the exclusivist nationalism developed by
Erdoğan and his ruling AKP party. Erdoğan’s nationalist ideology, which hereafter will be
identified as “Erdoğanism,” can essentially be understood as neo-Ottomanism, focusing heavily
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on the role of religion in the public square and using political Islam as a potent tool in cultivating
this new nationalist project. The AKP’s approach to the Erdoğanist nationalist project has been
aggressive and has, in turn, led to the massive and rapid proliferation of exclusivist nationalist
cultural heritage policies.
These policies are the focus of Part II. In this section, I provide quantitative data which
maps the decrease in properties belonging to ethno-religious minorities, and explore the property
cycle of appropriation, expropriation, and conversion which has become common under the
Erdoğan regime.
In Part III, I explore the impact of these policies and the Erdoğanist nationalist project on
Turkish society. Specifically, I provide segments from interviews I conducted with members of
the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul to explore the lived experience of ethno-religious
minorities in contemporary Turkey and illustrate the climate of impunity in which ethnoreligious minorities live.

Part I: Reconfiguring Separate and Unequal: Erdoğanism
There has emerged a popular trend in the unfolding historiography of the Erdoğan period
to compare Erdoğan and his ideology to Atatürk and his own ideology. As the prevailing
historical narrative has presented Kemalism as a largely positive secularist ideology that
effectively nullified the issue of religious difference and discrimination in Turkish society, a
complementary narrative has emerged painting Erdoğanism as antithetical to Kemalism. That is,
Erdoğanism is a problematic Islamist nationalist ideology that threatens to destroy the Turkish
Republic’s secular legal and civil tradition. This juxtaposition has been presented by experts and
amateurs alike. In a 2013 article for The National Interest entitled “Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk,”
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author Aram Bakshian Jr. includes a quote from an interviewee in Turkey. The interviewee
describes Erdoğan as: “‘...a strange joke played on Turkey by history. If Kemal Ataturk had had
an evil twin, it would have been someone exactly like Mr. Erdogan. Most of his views are mirror
opposites of Ataturk’s, but he is the first overwhelming larger-than-life figure in Turkish public
life since the Ghazi [Atatürk] himself.’”161
Elliot Ackerman penned a 2016 article for The New Yorker entitled “Atatürk Versus
Erdoğan: Turkey’s Long Struggle,” presenting a similar view of Atatürk and Erdoğan as
opponents whose ideologies are antithetical to one another. Ackerman touches on a connected
issue: Erdoğan’s self-distancing from Atatürk. Ackerman writes: “He [Erdoğan] views himself
as the father of a new Turkish identity, one aligned more closely with its Ottoman past, its
Islamic heritage.”162 Ackerman is correct in his extrapolation of Erdoğan’s identity construction.
Erdoğan has, indeed, crafted a specific image of himself and his ideology as a neo-Ottoman,
Muslim sultan—an identity which differs vastly from Atatürk’s own identity construction as a
secular, edified, ally of the West. This difference between Erdoğan and Atatürk’s constructed
identity images and accompanying leadership styles should not, however, be conflated with a
difference in core ideological values and policy objectives.
Erdoğanism is a departure from Kemalism inasmuch as it is presented with a religious
rather than secular face, and as it is implicitly focused on religious identity rather than ethnic
identity. The core of the ideologies and accompanying policies, however, which promote an
exclusivist nationalist vision of Turkey, remain consistent. As B. Ali Soner writes:
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...problems related to democracy and pluralism have in fact originated more from the
monist designations of the Turkish secularist establishment rather than from the Islamist
colour of the current political and social sphere...both Islamism and the Turkish secularist
establishment have failed to recognize social diversity in general, and to accommodate
non-Muslim religious, educational and organizational needs in particular. It was in this
sense that a political party’s relation with Islamism or the establishment is bound to
define in the Turkish context its policy approach towards non-Muslim minorities.163
And so one can understand Kemalism and Erdoğanism not as two warring ideologies, but rather
simply as two sides of the same coin.
Central to the Kemalist project was the instrumentalization of the intersection of state
policy and exclusivist identity politics. The pursuit of this intersection has come to hold a central
place in the Erdoğanist project, as well; Erdoğan has cultivated the connection between state
cultural heritage policies and Islam and created both an instrument and a symbol of
domination. Erdoğan’s project of identity domination is one that cuts across cultural, economic,
and political levels, but also expands beyond the realm of the domestic and into the
international. It is for this reason that Erdoğan’s exclusivist nationalist project can truly be
deemed “neo-Ottoman.” Historian Alan Mikhail illustrates the neo-Ottoman nature of Erdoğan’s
nationalism in a 2020 Time Magazine article, specifically comparing Erdoğan’s grand nationalist
project to that of the Ottoman Empire’s ninth sultan, Selim I. Mikhail writes:
Selim died 500 years ago in 1520. It was during his lifetime that the Ottoman Empire
grew from a strong regional power to a gargantuan global empire. For Erdogan, this
sultan from half a millennium ago serves his contemporary needs. Selim in many ways
functions as Erdogan’s Andrew Jackson, a figure from the past of symbolic use in the
present. Selim offers a template for Turkey to become a global political and economic
power, with influence from Washington to Beijing, crushing foreign and domestic
challengers alike. He helps Erdogan too to make his case for Islam as a cultural and
political reservoir of strength, a vital component of the glories of the Ottoman past, which
he seeks to emulate in contemporary Turkey against the dominant elite secularism that
has reigned since its founding. We should be wary of Erdogan’s embrace of Selim’s
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exclusionary vision of Turkish political power. It represents a historical example of
strongman politics that led to regional wars, the attempted annihilation of religious
minorities, and the monopolization of global economic resources.164
As Mikhail warns, this particular type of nationalism—entrenched in a broader master
plan with objectives of exclusion in all sectors, hegemony, and domination—is one which should
cause observers to take pause and proceed with immense caution. It is within this vein that the
Erdoğan regime has molded a new, neo-Ottoman ideal-type citizen. This ideal-type citizen is,
first and foremost, a devout Sunni Muslim, who is also ethnically Turkish and turned away from
Europe and the West. The non-ideal-type citizen, on the other hand, is, first and foremost,
religiously non-Muslim, and is also ethnically non-Turkish and is turned towards Europe and the
West.
The Erdoğanists’ nationalist theory is not codified in the same way that the Kemalists
was in the Turkish Review of Anthropology. Instead, direct media statements have served as the
thought space in which Erdoğan and the AKP have elucidated their nationalist ideological
doctrine. In a 2014 television interview that took place during Turkish national election season,
Erdoğan, who was, at the time, running for President, lamented his political opponents’
questioning of his own ethnic background. In his complaint, Erdoğan identified the superiorinferior dichotomy at the center of his own nationalist ideology. The Washington Post published
Erdoğan’s statement: “I was called a Georgian. I apologize for this, but they even said
[something] worse: They called me an Armenian.”165
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Part II: Cultural Heritage Policy as Reconquest
If one examines Turkey’s contemporary cultural heritage regime, they will find that
exclusivist Kemalist ideology and exclusivist Kemalist-era policies are deeply embedded in the
fabric of current laws. Many Kemalist policies are still in practice and have not received any
revisions: it is still notoriously difficult for ethno-religious minority organizations to obtain
building permits for churches and other religious and cultural buildings and sites;166 the daily
recitation of the Turkish Student Oath is still required167 in all public and private schools;168 and
the language policies of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as Article 42 of the 1983 Constitution are
still intact.169
Erdoğan and the AKP, while maintaining the most exclusivist of Kemalist policies, have
enacted a new wave of exclusivist nationalist cultural heritage policies reflective of their heavily
Islamist, neo-Ottoman project. In this section, I explore two facets of the AKP’s policies,
namely: “positive” state policies that paradoxically broaden and deepen protections for cultural
heritage for the AKP ideal-type majority (religiously Sunni Muslim, ethnic Turks) while
reinforcing the second class status of the country’s non-majority, ethno-religious citizens; and
“negative” state policies illustrating the increased discrimination and subjugation of AKP nonideal-type citizens (religiously non-Muslim, non-ethnic Turks). In my examination of “positive”
policies, I provide a brief overview of the mounting role and strength of the Diyanet in Turkey,
as well as the exponential and disproportionate increase of Islamic cultural heritage properties in
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Turkey. In my examination of “negative” policies, I examine cases of reconversion of Greek
Orthodox churches into mosques, with a focus on the major cases of Hagia Sophia and the Chora
Church.

The Diyanet
Given the Erdoğanist focus on Sunni Islam and, specifically, with Sunni Islam as a
political tool of the state, it is helpful not only to identify the numerical changes in the cultural
property and institutions of Turkey’s ethno-religious minorities, but also to examine the
numerical changes in the cultural property and institutions of Turkey’s Sunni Muslims—the
preferred community of the Erdoğanist state.
The shift to an explicit Sunni Islamic nationalism has come to dominate the Turkish
public sphere since the AKP’s rise to power. Emblematic and instructive are Erdoğan’s various
moments of Quranic recitation coupled with nationalist speeches on major Muslim and Turkish
holidays to see this phenomenon in action.170 One might also look to Mehmet Görmez, the
current president of the Diyanet, who led “national unity rallies in [Quranic] prayer” in the wake
of the failed 2016 military coup.171
However, it is the Turkish state’s explicit policies regarding the Diyanet, itself, that most
starkly reveal the shifting place of religion and Islam in Turkish state and civil society. Since
2006, the Turkish government has more than quadrupled the Diyanet’s budget172—in 2016, the
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Diyanet budget was a whopping 6.48 billion Turkish lira.173 The 2020 budget increased to 11.5
billion Turkish lira (1.4 billion U.S. dollars at current currency rates).174 Currently, the budget of
the Diyanet surpasses the individual budgets of the Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Interior, Energy and Natural Resources, Culture and Tourism, Industry and Technology, and
Environment and Urban Planning.175 This comparison communicates a clear hierarchy of the
Turkish state’s priorities. The Erdoğan regime has also overseen a 58% increase in employment
for the Diyanet (the number of Diyanet personnel rose from about 74,000 in 2002176 to about
117,000 in 2017177).
In 2013, the Turkish government also funded the launch of a Diyanet television network
and radio station, which have since operated seven days a week, 24 hours a day.178 The network
and station provide programming on a variety of topics which go beyond the confines of Islamic
theology; Muslim religious scholars lead programming on Turkish national history, world
history, and politics, all through the lens of political Islam.179
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Furthermore, the Turkish state’s passing of Law 6002 in 2010 placed ownership of all
new mosques within the jurisdiction of the Diyanet (many pre-existing mosques were owned by
Islamic foundations, which were not required to report to the federal government).180 It is also
helpful to map the exponential increase of mosques in Turkey as a backdrop against which one
can best understand the inverse phenomenon in the case of ethno-religious minority properties.
Between 2007 and 2017 alone, nearly 10,000 new mosques were built in Turkey,181
resulting in a total of 88,021 mosques in Turkey in 2017.182 This constitutes an almost 13%
increase in total mosques across Turkey within a mere decade. This number does not include the
mosques which were under construction at the time of the aforementioned data gathering in
2017. Since 2017, many more mosques have been built in Turkey. Many new mosques in
Turkey today, however, are not new constructions. On the contrary, these spaces are churches
which the Erdoğan regime has converted into mosques. The conversion of churches into
mosques is not a new phenomenon—this was common practice in the Ottoman Period—but it is
a method which the Erdoğan regime has adopted with an alacrity absent since the establishment
of the Turkish Republic. While Kemalist nationalism and cultural heritage policies were
exclusivist and discriminatory, they were decidedly more overtly geared towards issues of
ethnicity than issues of religion (at least on an explicit, de jure level). Erdoğanist policies, on the
other hand, have focused far more on religion as an identity marker, and this is crystallized in the
case of religious property policies.
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During the same period in which the Turkish state has so significantly increased cultural
heritage protections and development opportunities for Sunni Muslim cultural heritage sites, the
state has done the exact opposite for Greek Orthodox cultural heritage sites, reinforcing the shift
towards an ethno-religiously hegemonic and exclusivist model of nationalism. The striking
disproportionality of these policies is perhaps most illustrative in the well-known cases of the
2020 reconversions of the Church of Hagia Sophia and the Chora Church into mosques.

Hagia Sophia and Chora Church
Built in 537 by Byzantine Emperor Justinian I, Hagia Sophia, the Church of Holy
Wisdom, is widely regarded as the pinnacle of Byzantine art and architecture, and the symbol of
Christendom at its zenith. Apart from its renown as the world’s largest edifice for centuries,
Hagia Sophia was the most revered church in Christendom before the Great Schism of the 11th
century, and the spiritual hearth of global Orthodox Christianity. Hagia Sophia was converted
into a mosque (Ayasofya-i Kebir Cami-i Şerifi, the Holy Mosque of Hagia Sophia the Grand)
during the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, and converted into a museum by the Kemalists in
1935. Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1985,183 Hagia Sophia has long been
lauded as a feat of architecture, a masterpiece of art, and a paragon of universal cultural heritage.
Much to the dismay of the international community, the Turkish government reconverted
Hagia Sophia into a mosque on 10 July 2020. On 24 July, the 97th anniversary of the signing of
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the Treaty of Lausanne, Muslim prayers were held in Hagia Sophia.184 During a televised
broadcast announcing the prayer date, Erdoğan stated that the prayers would be “done at Hagia
Sophia as part of conquest festival [the annual Turkish state event celebrating the Fall of
Constantinople].”185
Despite the flood of attention surrounding the Summer 2020 reconversion (a search of
“Hagia Sophia 2020 Conversion” yields 414,000 results on Google), Erdoğan and the AKP
began orchestrating Hagia Sophia’s reconversion years ago. In 2005, the Association for the
Service of the Historical Foundations and the Environment filed a lawsuit to the Turkish Council
of State petitioning that Hagia Sophia be reconverted.186 The lawsuit was rejected, but the same
petition was filed again in 2016.187
Many news outlets incorrectly reported that 24 July was the first time in 86 years that
Muslim prayers were held in Hagia Sophia.188 In fact, Erdoğan recited the first verse of the
Quran during a prayer service in Hagia Sophia on 31 March 2018, dedicating the prayer to the
“souls of all who left us this work as inheritance, especially Istanbul’s conqueror.”189
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At the 24 July prayer service, Diyanet head Imam Ali Erbaş delivered a sermon with a
sword in hand.190 Duvar English reported, “Two green flags were also hung on the pulpit of the
mosque as a symbol of conquest.”191
While the Chora Church does not possess the same physical grandeur of Hagia Sophia, it
is a comparably significant piece of Greek Orthodox cultural heritage—the church’s famed
Byzantine mosaics and frescoes date back to the early 14th century and are some of the oldest
surviving icons of the Palaiologan style and era.192 Byzantine art history expert Robert
Ousterhout described the Chora Church as “Second in renown only to Hagia Sophia…[Chora]
holds some of the Byzantine world’s most astounding frescoes and mosaics.”193
Located in Edirnekapı, a historically Orthodox Christian and Jewish neighborhood of
Istanbul,194 the church was built in the early Byzantine period during the 4th century and was
converted into a mosque (and renamed Kariye Camii, or, Kariye Mosque) at the beginning of the
16th century following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople.195 In 1945, the Kemalists
designated the mosque a museum,196 and the museum opened to the public in 1958 under the
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name “Kariye Museum” (Kariye Müzesi). In the 1980s, the building was designated a UNESCO
World Heritage site.197
In November 2019, the Turkish Council of State ordered that the museum be reconverted
into a mosque,198 and, in August 2020, the building’s official status was changed to a
mosque.199 Although the flurry of news surrounding the Chora’s reconversion into a mosque
began with the Council of State’s 2019 ruling, the process of reconverting Chora into a mosque
had been underway since the early Erdoğan period, mirroring the measured planning of the AKP
regarding the reconversion of Hagia Sophia. The Association of Permanent Foundations and
Service to Historical Artifacts and Environment, a Turkish state organization, filed a lawsuit to
challenge Chora’s status as a museum in 2005, requesting that Chora be reconverted into a
mosque.200 In August 2020, Greek President Katerina Sakellaropoulou called the Turkish
government’s reconversion of Chora into a mosque an act of “symbolic violence,”201
highlighting the potency of cultural heritage as a tool of either inclusion or oppression.
The reconversion of these Orthodox churches into mosques is not merely significant as a
change in the function and use of historic, world-famous cultural property. Rather, the Turkish
state’s reconversion of these churches into mosques is best understood as the most recent episode
in the Turkish state’s historically continuous use of cultural heritage to build exclusivist
nationalism.
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The international response surrounding this reconversion episode is instructive in its own
right, revealing the deeply-ingrained errors in thinking regarding the continuity of Turkey’s
exclusivist nationalism and cultural heritage policies. In a July 2020 opinion piece for The
Washington Post entitled “Converting Hagia Sophia into a mosque is an act of cultural
cleansing,” famed Byzantinist Judith Herrin writes: “By serving as a museum, Hagia Sophia, a
vast, 1,500-year-old structure that previously served as a church and then a mosque, represented
the essence of Istanbul, a place where world-changing empires and religions conflicted and
intersected but whose monuments and artifacts can be enjoyed by all. Friday’s ruling marks a
symbolic end to this legacy of tolerance.”202
Even Herrin, a world-renowned scholar whose expertise is predicated upon a nuanced,
comprehensive understanding of the fate of Byzantine artifacts in both the Byzantine and postByzantine periods, falls victim to the erroneous notion that the Ottoman Empire and Turkish
Republic have created, over time, a “legacy of tolerance.” Surely, the long and copiously
recorded history of the Turkish state’s systematic destruction of the cultural heritage of ethnoreligious minorities does not constitute a “legacy of tolerance.” Unfortunately, Herrin’s written
expression of her misguided understanding of the Turkish cultural heritage regime was not
unique in the plethora of Summer 2020 thought pieces regarding Hagia Sophia’s reconversion.
An article published in October 2020 by the Global Security Review was titled: “Turkey
Uses Medieval Score-Settling To Justify Its Hagia Sophia Conversion.”203 While Turkey’s acts
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of reconversion certainly clash with the international legal norms of the modern day, they should
not be situated within the context of a “Medieval” method of policy-making and governance; in
the Turkish case, these policies are representative of the modern Turkish Republic of the 20th and
21st centuries. UNESCO stated that it “deeply regrets” Turkey’s conversion of the World
Heritage Site, writing: “Hagia Sophia is an architectural masterpiece and a unique testimony to
interactions between Europe and Asia over the centuries.”204 UNESCO’s conceptual
reconfiguration of Hagia Sophia as a symbol of positively-inflected cross-cultural
“interaction”—and one which is presented through the lens of a problematically Huntingtonian
over-simplification of division between two entire continental entities—clouds the reality of the
Turkish state’s designation of Hagia Sophia as a symbol of violent Turkish conquest.
If anything, the Hagia Sophia and Chora reconversions should not have elicited
widespread shock amongst the global intellectual circles, but rather a confirmation of what was
already clear. In her Washington Post article, Herrin identified the decision to reconvert Hagia
Sophia into a mosque as “scandalously dangerous and bigoted.” The reconversion decision was
dangerous and bigoted, indeed, but perhaps not so scandalous when set against a backdrop of
staunchly unwavering historical continuity.
Part III: Voices from Turkey’s Greek Orthodox Community: Living in a Climate of
Impunity
The data makes clear the success of the Turkish exclusivist nationalist projects—of both
the Kemalist and Erdoğanist varieties—and the more specific success of using cultural heritage
as a tool through which to achieve these projects. With the appropriation, expropriation, and
destruction of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage, Turkey’s Greek Orthodox
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population is nearing extinction. There is one question which cannot, however, be explicitly
answered, and whose answer can only be inferred from such data. What is the real quotidian
impact of such nationalism and such policies on the lived experience of the vulnerable group in
question (the Greek Orthodox Christians of Turkey)?
Quantitative data is certainly instructive and essential in delineating trends, but, given the
emotional and all-encompassing power and effect of cultural heritage, I felt it vital to also obtain
first-hand qualitative and experiential data from members of the Greek Orthodox community in
Turkey. For this reason, I conducted unstructured interviews with three Greek Orthodox
Christians who have lived or worked in Turkey, and who all self-identify as members of the
Greek Orthodox community in Turkey. Although this number of interviews and individuals is
certainly small, the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey is also small—it is helpful to recall
that only 1,700 to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians remain in Turkey today. The voices of the
individuals who I interviewed give expression to the climate of impunity that has been created
through Turkey’s policies of exclusivist nation-building and state control over cultural heritage.
All of the individuals who I interviewed insisted, for purposes of personal security, on
remaining completely anonymous in this thesis—even those individuals who no longer live or
work in Turkey. All of the individuals began by describing the general climate in
Turkey. Three common themes emerged: to live as a Greek Orthodox Christian in Turkey is to
constantly live in fear, to feel that one is constantly being surveyed by the Turkish state, and to
feel that one is viewed as a threat to and by the Turkish state.
A former Greek Orthodox employee of the Ecumenical Patriarchate who lived in Istanbul
for several years (Interviewee A) told me about the impact of Erdoğanist nationalism and cultural
heritage policies on his everyday life. Interviewee A recounted an episode that occurred at the
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beginning of his tenure in Istanbul: he recalls noticing a Turkish man “staring harshly”205 at him
and his cross, which he was wearing around his neck. Interviewee A told me that he felt
“nervous” in that moment, and the impact this had on him: “I said, alright, I’m not gonna wear
this [the cross] anymore. So I didn’t wear my cross the rest of the time I was in
Turkey.”206 Interviewee A told me that that episode made him far more aware of and fearful
about his status as an at-risk and endangered minority: “[after that] whenever I was in a taxi, I
never said that I was from the Greek minority.”207
Interviewee B, a Greek Orthodox resident of Istanbul (who is also a Turkish citizen and
speaks Turkish) told me about a similar episode and succession of events. One day in late 2016,
when Interviewee B was walking in Istanbul, where he has lived for nearly two decades, he was
cornered by a group of three young Turkish men who noticed the cross he was wearing around
his neck. The men spit at him, ripped his cross off his chest, and pushed him to the ground,
calling him a “filthy Christian.”208 After being pushed to the ground, he noticed that a group of
police officers were “standing across the street, watching and doing nothing except for chuckling
at what they had just seen.”209 That assault prompted him to stop wearing his cross in
public.210
I ask Interviewee B how this episode made him feel; he tells me, “It was terrifying, but
not shocking. Here [in Turkey], even if we [Greek Orthodox Christians] speak Turkish and carry
a Turkish passport, we are not treated like ‘real’ Turks. And it is not surprising that other Turks
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would not see us that way—our government, after all, tells them that our people and our culture
do not deserve respect.”211
Interviewee C, who was a prominent leader of the Greek Orthodox community in
Istanbul for over a decade, also cites this climate of fear and discrimination. He says: “You
always feel threatened. I mean, when we’re doing Pascha [Orthodox Easter] and we’re
outside,212 the thought was in our mind every time: Okay, what happens if someone bombs us
now? What happens if someone comes in shooting? Or, when we go out for Theophany:213
What happens if we’re attacked by the Islamists or the Grey Wolves [the far-right, neo-fascist
Turkish political organization affiliated with Turkey’s far-right Nationalist Movement
Party]?”214
Interviewee C told me that he was also scared to wear a cross or Orthodox Christian
religious dress: “I personally would not wear anything [Christian]. I was scared of being
attacked by nationalists or fundamentalists. It did not feel like a safe place to wear anything like
that [Christian religious dress] in. It is an anti-Christian type of culture.”215 Interviewee C also
described the position of Greek Orthodox organizations in Turkey: “The discrimination was
always there. In terms of the laws and everything. And there is the feeling like, somehow, as an
institution, we were a suspicious group of people that was like a thorn in the side of the state.
When dealing with the government, you always immediately feel that you’re ranked number two
or number three in society and that you’re under close watch.”216 I asked Interviewee C to
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elaborate on the feeling of being under close watch. Interviewee C responded: “It doesn’t feel
like you’re being watched. You are being watched.”217 Interviewee A also pointed this out: “As
a Greek Orthodox Christian in Turkey, you always know that you need to be looking over your
shoulder. You always assume that someone is watching or listening.”218
After telling me about this general climate and experience of fear, discrimination,
violence, and surveillance, all of the individuals whom I interviewed identified an interesting
connection between state cultural heritage policies and treatment of minorities. As the Turkish
state enacted more cultural heritage policies that were detrimental to ethno-religious minorities
and reflected exclusivist nationalist ideals, there was more open hostility towards minorities from
Turks in the nationalistic “majority” (i.e. ethnic Turks and/or religious Sunni Muslims).
I ask Interviewee B if the treatment of Christians and non-ethnic Turks has changed in
the past two decades. He tells me: “Yes. Of course. As Erdoğan has become more powerful
and completed more of his plans, everyday life is always becoming more difficult, and our rights
are always disappearing. Everyday, the government takes away another church from
us. Everyday, they make a new law that makes it impossible for us to take care of [sustain and
renovate] the churches. Now, we have almost nothing that is ours. We cannot do anything about
it, and other Turks are happy to see us suffer.”219
Interviewee A speaks to a similar trend: “As time went on, I had to make more
accommodations to my everyday life. You have to make small corrections in your everyday
lived experience to avoid any sort of conflict.”220 Interviewee C told me of his increased
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“anxiety and panic”221 as Erdoğan and the AKP intensified their exclusivist nationalist project,
and described the feeling of leaving Turkey: “Each time I would fly out [of Turkey], it felt like a
huge weight had been lifted from my shoulders. It was something that I would always feel right
when we took off, and the feeling got stronger each time. For years and years, it was like, Thank
God.”222
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CONCLUSION
As I write this conclusion, Turkey is at a critical juncture. Ill-advised foreign
adventurism in Syria and Iraq, maritime and airspace aggression towards Mediterranean
neighbors Greece and Cyprus, and involvement in the 2020 conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh underscore Turkey’s rogue state behaviors. Turkey’s economy
continues its five-year economic crisis across all metrics, including a precipitous drop in the
value of the Turkish lira, concomitant crises in the finance and banking systems, and rising
unemployment and lack of public confidence in the government’s economic policy. Meanwhile,
Turkey’s sharp decline in its human rights performance has contributed to the country’s regime
transformation towards authoritarianism, summarized in the most recent 2021 Freedom House
report that ranks Turkey as the 32nd most “un-free country in the world.”223 The Committee to
Protect Journalists’ (CPJ) 2020 end-of-year global survey of jailed journalists ranked Turkey as
second in the world for the highest number of jailed journalists, narrowly following China.224
CPJ reported its findings on Turkey:
“CPJ found 37 journalists imprisoned [in Turkey] this year...authorities continue to arrest
journalists – and their lawyers...In the weeks leading up to CPJ’s census, Turkish authorities
arrested at least three journalists working for pro-Kurdish outlet Mezopotamya News Agency for
their critical coverage, including Cemil Uğur, who alleged in a story that military personnel
detained and tortured two villagers and threw them from a helicopter; one later died. (Turkish
officials said the civilians were injured resisting arrest).”225
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Turkey’s continuing hard shift in the direction of authoritarianism, expressed in its
foreign policy, political economy, and measures of civil and political liberties, has, in many
ways, reinforced all of the non-democratic features of Kemalist and Erdoganist versions of
exclusivist nationalism. At the same time, these conditions are also reinforcing Turkey’s
exclusivist nationalist project: on the domestic level, Turkey’s economic crises have led the AKP
to default to hyper-nationalist rhetoric; on the foreign level, Turkey’s foreign policy adventurism
has been articulated in terms of exclusivist nationalism and instrumentalized as an opportunity to
justify the export of Turkey’s exclusivist nationalism. In both regards, this confluence of events
suggests that cultural heritage policy will continue to be used in a manner to reinforce the
Turkish state’s exclusivist nationalist project and justify Turkey’s complementary cultural
heritage policies. As a consequence, the further endangerment of the Greek Orthodox
community of Turkey and of Turkey’s other ethno-religious minorities is inevitable.
The Turkish case is simply one paradigmatic piece of a broader emerging trend:
authoritarian regimes across the world are molding forms of exclusivist nationalism that place
ethno-religious minorities at risk, and these regimes increasingly turn to cultural heritage policy
as a concrete and visual manifestation and operationalization of that exclusivism.
On the eve of the centennial of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the impact of
Turkey’s exclusivist nationalist project and cultural heritage policies is thrown into sharpest
relief—nearing extinction, the Greek Orthodox citizens of Turkey are the living example of the
potentially lethal symbiosis of cultural heritage and exclusivist nationalism.
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